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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is before the Court on a Petition by appellant/defendant City of South 
Jordan (the "City") requesting leave to appeal from an interlocutory order of the Third 
District Court, State of Utah ("Petition"). That interlocutory order granted 
appellee/plaintiff Daniel Pearson's ("Mr. Pearson") Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, and denied the City's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This Court 
granted the Petition. R. 277. Jurisdiction here is pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Did the district court err in its analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves applying Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105 to the facts of Mr. Pearson's employment. A district court's interpretation of a 
Utah statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Olson v. Utah Dep }t of Health, 
2009 UT App 3035 ^  9, 221 P.3d 836. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved in the parties' cross-motions 
for partial summary judgment. See R. 24-29, 221-24 (Pearson's PSJMem.); R. 47-51, 
201-06 (City's PS J Mem.), and in the parties' oral arguments at hearing (R. 380-410) 
(Hrg. Trans.). It also is preserved in the district court's Memorandum Decision (R. 225-
29), and its subsequent Order granting Mr. Pearson's Motion for Partial Summary 
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Judgment, and denying the City's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Order on 
Summary Judgment") (R. 231 -34). 
2. Issue: Did the district court err in its application of Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105, including its finding that Mr. Pearson was not at-will under that statute, and 
granting his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment? 
Standard of Review: Review of a summary judgment determination is "'for 
correctness, granting no deference to the [district] court's legal conclusions.'" Salt Lake 
County v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, \ 14, 234 P.3d 1105 (citation omitted). The 
appellate court will "determine only whether the [district] court erred in applying the 
governing law and whether the [district] court correctly held that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact." Id. (citation omitted). "The proper interpretation and application 
of a statute is a question of law which [is reviewed] for correctness, affording no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusions." Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 
914-15 (Utah 1998). See also, Standard of Review, Issue No. 1, supra. 
Preservation of Issue: Relevant facts of Mr. Pearson's job history and status are 
set forth in: (1) Mr. Pearson's summary judgment memoranda (R. 23-24, 219-21); (2) the 
City's summary judgment memoranda (R. 43-46), and (3) the transcript of the oral 
argument on the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment (R. 380-410). The 
district court's ruling as to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 is preserved in its Memorandum 
Decision (R. 225-29) and subsequent Order on Summary Judgment (R. 231-34). 
vii 
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III. STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Statutes of central importance to this appeal are set forth below in relevant part. In 
addition, copies of statutes and rules of central importance are attached as Exhibit 1 in the 
Addendum to this Brief ("City's Addendum"). 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (enacted 1977) (version at hiring) (R. 161). 
All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members of the 
police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and superintendents, 
shall hold their employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge 
or dismissal only as hereinafter provided. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (effective May 3, 2004) (version at termination). 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall 
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension 
of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less 
remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person exercising 
executive power in the municipality; 
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department 
in a first or second class city;1 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;... 
Employees of police and fire departments in cities of the first and second class 
that choose to have a civil service commission are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1001 through -1013. The City of South Jordan has a population of slightly more 
than 50,000, and is a city of the third class. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-301. 
viii 
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3. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1002, -1012, -1012.5 (classified civil service in cities 
of first and second class).2 
(1) The classified civil service shall consist of all places of employment 
now existing or hereafter created in or under the police department and the fire 
department of each first or second class city that establishes a civil service 
commission, except the head of the departments, deputy chiefs of the police and 
fire departments, and assistant chiefs of the police department in cities of the first 
and second class, and the members of the board of health of the departments. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002 (emphasis added). 
(1) All persons in the classified civil service may be suspended as provided 
in Section 10-3-912, or removed from office or employment by the head of the 
department for misconduct, incompetency, failure to perform duties, or failure to 
observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the 
suspended or discharged person to the civil service commission. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1012. 
Any final action or order of the commission may be appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for review.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918 (Laws 2003) (Chief of police or marshal in a 
city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or 
town). 
The chief of police or marshal in each city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or 
town: 
(2) may, with the consent of the person or body that appointed the chief or 
marshal, appoint assistants to the chief of police or marshal. 
2Seen.l, supra. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-919 (Laws 2003) (Powers, duties, and obligations 
of police chief, marshal, and their assistants 
in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or 
town). 
The chief of police, marshals, and their assistants in a city of the third, fourth, or 
fifth class or town shall have all of the powers, rights, and duties respectfully 
conferred on such officers in Sections 10-3-913 through 10-3-915. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103. 
(l)(b) "Law enforcement officer" specifically includes the following: 
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, chief of police, police officer, or marshal of 
any county, city, or town. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6 (Laws 1993) (Notifying subscriber or 
customer of court order) (electronic 
surveillance). 
(1) (f) As used in this subsection, "supervisory official" means the investigative 
agent in charge or assistant investigative agent in charge or an equivalent of an 
investigative's headquarters or regional office; a county sheriff or chief deputy 
sheriff, or police chief or assistant police chief, the officer in charge of an 
investigative task force or the assistant officer in charge; or the attorney general, an 
assistant attorney general, a county attorney or district attorney, a deputy county 
attorney or deputy district attorney, or the chief prosecuting attorney of any 
political subdivision of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3. 
A provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly 
declared to be retroactive. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a ruling against the City by the Honorable 
A. Toomey, Salt Lake City Department, Utah Third District Court, on the parties' 
x 
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cross-motions for partial summary judgment. See R. 225-29 (Mem. Decis.); R. 231-34 
(Order on Summary Judgment). 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
Mr. Pearson's Employment and Termination. 
1. The City of South Jordan (the "City") has a population of slightly more that 
50,000 and is classified under Utah law as a city of the third class. R. 47; Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-2-301 (classifications of Utah municipalities based on population). 
2. Mr. Pearson was hired by the City in July 2002 as assistant police chief. R. 
3, f 11 (CompL). When the City hired Mr. Pearson for its police department, he was an 
at-will employee under Utah statute, which was the 1977 version of Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105. R.43,f 2;R. 161; R. 397 (Hrg. Trans.); R. 219. 
3. Mr. Pearson's position is that "the original version of § 10-3-1105 does not 
mandate the at-will status of any employee the original statute is not relevant to the 
issue of statutory interpretation before the Court." See R. 219 (Pearson's Opp. to City's 
Motion PSJ). 
4. Mr. Pearson was terminated January 30, 2007. R. 3,111 (CompL). South 
Jordan City Manager Rick Horst ("City Manager Horst") gave Mr. Pearson a letter of 
termination which states that Mr. Pearson's employment is at-will and he can be 
terminated "with or without cause or explanation." R. 166. 
xi 
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Mr, Pearson's Hearing Before Employee Appeals Board. 
5. On January 31, 2007, Mr. Pearson faxed a letter to the City titled "Notice of 
Intent to Appeal Termination." R. 166-67. City Manager Horst informed Mr. Pearson 
that his letter had been received and that the due process appeals procedure contained in 
the City's Employee Handbook, which was based on Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, did 
not apply to him because he was an at-will employee. R. 169. 
6. On February 8, 2007, Mr. Pearson sent the City another letter which stated 
that it was an appeal of his termination, and also stated that if an appeal of his termination 
was refused, the letter was to be considered as notice of his intention to grieve his 
termination under the City's grievance procedure. R. 171. 
7. The City's Employee Appeals Board ("Appeals Board") agreed to hear Mr. 
Pearson's grievance only as to whether or not he was an at-will employee. R. 83. The 
Appeals Board has a dual purpose: (a) to hear appeals of merit3 of employees under Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, and (b) to hear the grievance of any employee, whether at-will or 
not. 
3In this appeal, the City will use the terms customarily used by Mr. Pearson. 
Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, a "merit employee" refers to an employee of a 
municipality who has an established right under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 to the due 
process set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. An "at-will employee" refers to an 
employee of a municipality who does not have an established right under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-3-1105 to such process. For general purposes here, whether a municipal employee is 
by statute "at-will" or "merit" is determined by § 10-3-1105. 
xii 
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8. After hearing testimony and reviewing documents presented, the Appeals 
Board's decision was that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. R. 3, If 14 (Compl.). 
Mr. Pearson's Appeal to Utah Court of Appeals. 
9. On May 10, 2007, Mr. Pearson filed a Petition in the Utah Court of Appeals 
seeking review of the Appeals Board's decision on his grievance. See Petition for 
Review (Case No. 20070378CA). 
Court of Appeals Transfers Mr. Pearson's Appeal to District Court. 
10. On September 10,2007, the Court of Appeals issued an Order on its own 
motion stating it had no jurisdiction over Mr. Pearson's appeal, and also stating that it 
was transferring the matter to the district court because the appeal "should have been filed 
with the district court." See Order (Case No. 20070378CA) (Sept. 10, 2007). The matter 
was transferred to the West Jordan Department, Third District Court, where it was 
assigned Case No. 070418144. 
Mr. Pearson's Appeal in West Jordan Department of Third District Court. 
11. On December 14, 2007, the City filed a "Motion for Summary Disposition 
of Appeal" in Case No. 070418144, based on the argument that a district court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal from a grievance and a municipality's appeals 
board's decision on whether an employee is an at-will or a merit employee. See Case No. 
20080164CA (Exhibit to City's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal). The district court 
denied the Motion and declined to decide whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 
xiii 
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City's First Petition Seeking Interlocutory Review. 
12. The City then filed a Petition for Interlocutory Review on grounds that a 
district court cannot decline to rule on its own subject matter jurisdiction. That Petition 
was assigned Case No. 20080164CA 
Mr. Pearson's First Appeal Reinstated to Utah Court of Appeals. 
13. The Court of Appeals did not rule on the City's Petition for Interlocutory 
Review (Case No. 20080164CA). The Petition was rendered moot when the Court of 
Appeals instead undertook to decide itself the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
14. After briefing and oral argument, and using formerly-assigned Case No. 
20070378CA, the Court of Appeals issued a decision on July 30, 2009. The decision held 
that neither the Court of Appeals nor the district court had appellate jurisdiction over a 
decision by a municipality's employee appeals board where the decision was not the 
result of an appeal conducted under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. See Pearson v. South 
Jordan, 2009 UT App 204, 216 P.3d 996. 
15. Pearson v. South Jordan instructed that when an employee and 
municipality disagree about whether the employee is an at-will employee or a merit 
employee under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, a declaratory judgment action should be 
filed in district court. Pearson, 2009 UT App 204, ffi[ 16-17, 216 P.3d 996. 
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Mr. Pearson Files a Complaint in District Court. 
16. On or about September 1, 2009, after the Pearson v. South Jordan decision 
was issued, Mr. Pearson filed a "Complaint and Request for Declaratory Judgment" 
("Complaint") in Third District Court. SeeR. 1-11. His Complaint sought a declaratory 
judgment that, as the City's assistant police chief, his employment was not at-will under 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. R. 1-5. In addition, the Complaint asserted common law 
claims for breach of oral and written contracts by the City based on Mr. Pearson's 
contention that alleged contracts removed him from at-will status. R. 5-8. The City 
answered the Complaint on October 7, 2009. See R. 12-20 (Answer). 
Mr. Pearson Files a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
17. On October 29, 2009, only three weeks after the City answered the 
Complaint, Mr. Pearson filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and supporting 
Memorandum. R. 30-31 ("Pearson's Motion"); R. 22-29 ("Pearson's Mem."). 
18. Mr. Pearson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requested a 
"declaration" that Mr. Pearson "was not statutorily ' at-will' at the time of his 
termination." R. 30. 
19. Mr. Pearson did not seek summary judgment on his other claims and those 
claims are still pending before the district court, and further action has been stayed by the 
district court pending the outcome of this appeal. See R. 279-80. 
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The City Files a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
20. On November 12, 2009, the City responded to Mr. Pearson's Motion and 
filed its own Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of whether Mr. 
Pearson was an at-will employee under Utah statute. See R. 33-34 ("City's Motion"); R. 
36-54 ("City's Combined Mem."). 
21. Included in the City's summary judgment Facts were: (a) Mr. Pearson 
admitted that when the City hired him as assistant police chief in July 2002, he was an at-
will employee under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (R. 161) (R. 43-45, ^  7); (b) the City 
always considered Mr. Pearson to be an at-will employee (R. 45-46, fflf 11-15); (c) as it 
related to the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105, Utah cities typically use "Assistant 
Police Chief as the title for the number two person in the organization" and the term 
"deputy police chief is "very uncommon in the state of Utah" (R. 46, ^ fl[ 16-17). 
22. On December 21, 2009, the City filed a reply in support of its cross-motion 
for partial summary judgment. See R. 201 -10. 
Oral Argument on the Parties' Cross-Motions For Partial Summary Judgment. 
23. On February 11, 2010, the district court conducted oral argument on the 
parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment. R. 217 (Minute Entry). At the 
hearing, the district court pointed out that the court file did not contain a reply 
memorandum by Mr. Pearson, and asked Mr. Pearson to file that reply memorandum after 
the hearing. R. 381-82 (Hrg. Trans.). 
xvi 
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24. Mr. Pearson's counsel argued first at the hearing. See R. 383. He requested 
"a judicial review of the statute at issue, Utah Code Annotated 10-3-1105." R. 383. One 
of his arguments was that § 10-3-1105 "is an affirmative statute, meaning that it simply 
bestows on certain individuals additional rights, but that it doesn't take away anybody's 
rights or mandate the at will status of any employee. Under that interpretation, my 
client's position then would be simply unaffected by the statute . . ." R. 384-85. 
25. In its oral argument, the City stated that when Mr. Pearson was hired in 
2002, "it was the earlier statute [i.e., pre-2004 version] we were looking at and all 
members of the police department were at will under Section 10-3-1105." R. 397. The 
City also addressed its belief that the version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 which was 
in effect when Mr. Pearson was terminated, is ambiguous. R. 389-98. In addition, the 
City argued that there is a "catch-all" provision in the 2004 version of the statute. R. 395-
96. The City also asked the district court to review Ward v. Richfield, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), where the Court rejected a plaintiffs argument that § 10-3-1105's (eff. 
1977) exclusion of "members of the police department" from coverage as merit 
employees did not apply to him because he had a different title, i.e., he was a "city 
marshal with appointed assistants," and was not a member of a "police department." R. 
394-95. 
26. In response to the City's argument, Mr. Pearson disagreed that there is a 
"catch-all" section in the 2004 version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. R. 398-99. 
xvii 
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27. Mr. Pearson also argued to the district court that the pre-2004 version of 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 was not relevant to the statutory issue, stating: 
Also, if we-my-argument is that certainly, that we should be looking at 
what the statute was at the time my client was terminated. I think the statute 
as it was at the time my client was hired is more relevant to the contract 
question . . . . Again, I think that the more relevant question deals with what 
the statute is, but if we want to look back and start asking, okay, what 
exactly was it when he was hired, either the city didn't know, didn't 
understand the statute or their policy was simply in violation of the law and 
it's very difficult for them to go back and try to reconstruct that. 
R. 400-01. 
28. After the hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement (R. 
217). 
29. On February 12, 2010, Mr. Pearson filed a reply memorandum in support of 
his Motion. R. 218-23. 
District Court's Memorandum Decision, 
30. On April 6, 2010, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision. See R. 
225-29. The court found that "[t]his case turns on the construction of Utah Code section 
10-3-1105." R.226. 
31. The Memorandum Decision does not address the fact that at the time the 
City hired Mr. Pearson, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 mandated that all police and fire 
department employees were at-will. See R. 225-29. 
32. Addressing the 2004 version of § 10-3-1105, the Memorandum Decision 
examines the dictionary definitions of "assistant" and "deputy" and states that "'deputy' is 
xviii 
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defined as 'a person appointed as a substitute with power to act/ and 'a second in 
command or assistant who usually takes charge when his or her superior is absent.5" R. 
227. The Memorandum Decision also states that an "assistant" is "one who assists," and 
that "[t]he word 'deputy' thus encompasses someone not only who assists someone else, 
but someone who, with greater authority, may conduct the business of another." R. 227. 
It then concluded that the statute is not ambiguous. R. 228. 
33. The Memorandum Decision also rejected the City's argument that "a deputy 
of a head of a municipal department" can be viewed as a catch-all provision which would 
encompass Mr. Pearson's position as assistant police chief, and stated that this would 
make the statute redundant. R. 228-29. 
34. On May 14, 2010, the district court signed an Order Granting Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See R. 213-34. The Order echoed the court's 
Memorandum Decision. See id. 
The City's Second Petition Seeking Interlocutory Review. 
35. On June 3, 2010, the City filed a Petition requesting interlocutory review of 
the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order. See R. 252-53, 255. On August 
30, 2010, the Petition was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. R. 275. 
36. The Court of Appeals granted the Petition on September 7, 2010. R. 277. 
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Mr. Pearson's Hiring and Position as Assistant Police Chief. 
1. The City hired Mr. Pearson in July 2002 as assistant police chief. R. 35 ^  11 
(Compl). 
2. When the City hired Mr. Pearson as assistant police chief, all police and fire 
department employees were at-will under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. See R. 161; see 
also Ex. 1 in City's Addendum. 
3. Mr. Pearson admits that when the City hired him he knew that all police 
department members were at-will employees under the version of Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105 effective at that time. R. 89-90. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 was amended effective May 3, 2004 to reflect 
its present language. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (history). 
5. The duties and responsibilities of the City's assistant police chief position 
are set forth in a job description which shows that Mr. Pearson was second-in-command 
in the police department and second-in-command to the City's "Public Safety Director." 
SeeR. 179. 
6. The City's job description for assistant police chief, which was effective as 
of March 2003 , placed "assistant police chief in the "Department of Public Safety" in the 
"Division" of "Police." R. 179. It is an "exempt" classification, and its "General 
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Purpose" is stated as "[a]ssumes total responsibility of the department in the absence of 
the Public Safety Director." R. 179. 
7. Under "Supervision Received," the City's job description for assistant 
police chief states "[w]orks under the broad guidance and direction of the Public Safety 
Director. Assumes departmental responsibility in the absence of Chief of Police." R. 
179. 
8. The City's organizational charts at the time Mr. Pearson was terminated 
show that, as "Assistant Chief of Police," he was second-in-command in the City's police 
department. R. 173-75. The organizational chart shows Lindsay Shepherd as "Chief of 
Police." R. 173-75. 
9. The letterhead stationary for the South Jordan City Public Safety 
Department at the time Mr. Pearson was terminated identifies him as "Chief of Police 
Operations" and Lindsay Shepherd as "Director of the Department of Public Safety." R. 
177. 
10. Mr. Pearson admitted that during the entire time he was employed by the 
City, he reported directly to Lindsay Shepherd, the Chief of Police. R. 95-96. 
Mr. Pearson's Termination. 
11. Mr. Pearson was terminated January 30, 2007. The termination letter given 
to Mr. Pearson by South Jordan City Manager Rick Horst ("City Manager Horst") states 
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Mr. Pearson's position is at-will and that his termination can be "with or without cause or 
explanation." R. 166. 
12. City Manager Horst testified that he viewed Mr. Pearson as second-in-
command in the City's police department, and that, as assistant police chief, Mr. Pearson 
generally represented the police department at City meetings when Police Chief Lindsay 
Shepard was unavailable. R. 107. 
13. Paul Cunningham was the City's Director of Asset Management at the time 
Mr. Pearson was terminated, and he had responsibility for human resources. R. 126-27. 
In response to a question by Mr. Pearson well before Mr. Pearson's termination, Mr. 
Cunningham had informed Mr. Pearson that, as assistant police chief, he was at-will. R. 
127-28. 
14. Mr. Cunningham testified regarding Mr. Pearson's position as assistant 
police chief that "It's a semantic difference and that he is the number two person. He is 
the assistant of the Police Chief, or the deputy. It's the same thing." R. 127-28. Mr. 
Cunningham also stated that Utah cities typically use "Assistant Police Chief as the title 
for the number two person in the organization," (R. 134-35), and that the title "deputy 
police chief is "very uncommon in the state of Utah" (R. 135-36). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Statutory interpretation and Utah case law show that, under Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105, Mr. Pearson was at-will. 
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First, the statute that applies here is the one in effect when the City hired Mr. 
Pearson as assistant police chief in 2002. Under that statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105, all members of municipal police and fire departments in cities of the third, 
fourth, and fifth classes were at-will. Mr. Pearson admits this and also admits that when 
he was hired, he was an at-will employee by statute. However, the district court 
disregarded the 2002 version of § 10-3-1105, apparently swayed by Mr. Pearson's 
position in oral argument that the version of § 10-3-1105 in effect when Mr. Pearson was 
hired was not particularly relevant to the statutory argument and was more applicable to 
his contract claims that now have been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. 
However, this ignored that the law to be applied by the district court is the "statute in 
effect at the time of the controversy," and that an employee becomes a statutory at-will 
employee at the time of hiring, not at the time of termination. This is reflected in Board 
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), where the United States Supreme Court stated 
that the employee's employment rights were "created and defined" by the "terms of his 
appointment." 
Second, since statutory due process rights did not attach at the time of hiring so as 
to make Mr. Pearson a merit employee, they could attach only if there was a later statute 
which retroactively made Mr. Pearson a merit employee. However, the 2004 amendments 
to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 on which Mr. Pearson relies do not specify that they 
should be applied retroactively. Under Utah law, a statute or statutory amendment may 
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not be applied retroactively unless it states it is retroactive. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3. 
Third, a statutory amendment also cannot be applied retroactively if it 
"substantively modifies" the prior version of the statute. Mr. Pearson's arguments 
focused only on Mr. Pearson's substantive rights, and ignored that the City also has 
substantive rights which allowed it under pre-amendment Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 to 
terminate any police department member without cause. An amendment can be applied 
retroactively only when: "(1) the legislative change merely 'clarifies] the meaning of the 
earlier enactment,' or (2) the amendment changed the law in a procedural way that does 
not effect the substantive rights of the parties." Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, Tj 41, 234 
P.3d 1105 (citations omitted). These do not apply here. 
Fourth, the district court's failure to assess whether the pre- or post-2004 version 
of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 should apply, was plain error. In this case, the error was 
or should have been obvious to the district court, since both versions of the statute were 
submitted to the district court and were discussed in oral argument, yet the district court 
addressed only the May 3, 2004 version. The City was prejudiced by the district court's 
failure to address the earlier version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. 
Fifth, as assistant police chief, Mr. Pearson was also an at-will employee under the 
amended version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 in effect at the time the City terminated 
him. There is no merit to his argument that the plain language of § 10-3-1105 should 
apply so that he was not an at-will employee because his title was "assistant police chief 
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and not "deputy police chief." This Court should look beyond the plain language of 
amended § 10-3-1105 because: (1) the term "a deputy police chief is ambiguous in the 
context of § 10-3-1105 and as shown by reference to several statutes in the same and 
related chapters, and (2) construing "a deputy police chief solely as a title and not as a 
hierarchal position/category "works an absurd result." 
Sixth, because § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous, it can be interpreted through extrinsic 
evidence, and it should be found here that "a deputy" is best interpreted as the second-in-
command. This means that Mr. Pearson was at-will under § 10-3-1105(2)(d) because his 
position equated to and was the same as "a deputy police chief as defined. Significantly, 
the district court's definitional analysis of § 10-3-1105 actually supports that Mr. Pearson 
was an at-will employee based on his job responsibilities. This is consistent with the 
City's position at oral argument that the legislature's use of the indefinite article "a" to 
reference "a deputy" instead of the definite article "the," is indicative of the intent of the 
legislature to view "a deputy" as a hierarchal category/position, and not just a plain-
language title. Policy considerations also support viewing "a deputy" as a hierarchal 
position/category of a second-in-command. This would be consistent with the 
legislature's apparent intent that there should be no requirement of just cause when 
terminating municipal employees who are not directly involved in a meaningful and 
significant way with policy, oversight, and responsibility for managing a municipal 
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department. The undisputed facts of Mr. Pearson's responsibilities as assistant police 
chief show that he was second-in command. 
Seventh, as assistant police chief, Mr. Pearson also could be terminated without 
cause because he was "a deputy of a head of a municipal department" under § 
10-3-1105(2)(h). Since no department is identified in § 10-3-1105(2)(g) or (h), these 
provisions can be viewed as "a catch-all" in which exact titles (i.e., plain language) are 
not relevant. Such catch-all provisions allow municipalities to retain their existing job 
titles, and they are consistent with the reasoning in Ward v. Richfield City. In this 
context, it is also significant here that Mr. Pearson was not just assistant police chief, he 
also was "Chief of Police Operations" in the South Jordan Department of Public Safety. 
VL ARGUMENT 
A. MR. PEARSON WAS AT-WILL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1105. 
Statutory interpretation and Utah case law show that, under Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105, Mr. Pearson was at-will when the City hired him, and he continued to be at-
will until he was terminated. 
1, Mr. Pearson Was Hired as a Statutory At-will Employee, and 
Continued as an At-will Employee Throughout His Employment. 
Mr. Pearson was a statutory at-will employee when the City hired him as assistant 
police chief, and his at-will status was not changed by the enactment of a later version of 
the same statute. 
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The City pointed out to the district court that when the City hired Mr. Pearson as 
assistant police chief in July 2002, he was at-will because all members of municipal 
police and fire departments were at-will under the version of Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105 that was in effect in July 2002. R. 397. That version of § 10-3-1105 states: 
All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than 
members of the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, 
and superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation of 
time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (emphasis added) (R. 161). 
Under this statute, all municipal employees other than those specifically excluded 
were to be treated by municipalities as merit employees who had an established right to 
due process protections. All members of municipal police and fire departments were 
excluded by the statute, and had no right to due process. Even Mr. Pearson admitted that 
he knew he was an at-will employee under statutory law at the time the City hired him. 
Facts Tf 3. However, when this issue was raised by the City at the hearing on the parties' 
cross-motions for summary judgment {see R 395-96), Mr. Pearson's response was that the 
2002 version of § 10-3-1105 in effect when Mr. Pearson was hired was not particularly 
relevant, i.e., his counsel argued that: 
we should be looking at what the statute was at the time my client was 
terminated. I think the statute as it was at the time my client was hired is 
more relevant to the contract question . . . . if we want to look back and start 
asking, okay, what exactly was [the statute] when he was hired, either the 
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city didn't know, didn't understand the statute or their policy was simply in 
violation of the law and it's very difficult for them to try to go back and 
reconstruct that. 
R. 400-01. 
Similarly, Mr. Pearson's position at oral argument on § 10-3-1105fs history was 
that it "is an affirmative statute, meaning that it simply bestows on certain individuals 
additional rights, but that it doesn't take away anybody's rights or mandate the at will 
status of any employee. Under that interpretation, my client's position then would be 
simply unaffected by the statute . . ." R. 384-85. 
The district court apparently accepted this argument by Mr. Pearson, because the 
version of § 10-3-1105 that was in effect when Mr. Pearson was hired was not addressed 
in the district court's summary judgment decision. However, the statute in effect when 
Mr. Pearson was hired should have been addressed by the district court prior to and in 
conjunction with any assessment or application of the version of Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105 that was in effect when Mr. Pearson was terminated. 
The district court's duty on summary judgment is to assess the governing law, and 
the parties do not dispute that some version of § 10-3-1105 is the governing statutory law. 
See Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, \ 14, 234 P.3d 1105. Generally, the law to be applied 
by the district court is the "statute in effect at the time of the controversy." Id. at \ 41 
(citations omitted). The essence of Mr. Pearson's statutory complaint is that he had due 
process rights at the time of his termination under § 10-3-1106, because the 2004 version 
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of § 10-3-1105 made him a merit employee and did not take anything away from rights he 
already had. SeeR. 384-85. 
This analysis is flawed. Whether there is a statutory due process right is 
established at the time of hiring, not termination. This is shown in Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), where in discussing whether a university employee had a right 
to due process, the United States Supreme Court stated that the employee's employment 
rights were "created and defined" by the "terms of his appointment." See Roth, 408 U.S. 
at 577-78. See also, e.g., Randall v. Buena Vista County Hosp., 75 F. Supp.2d 946, 955-
56 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (due process requires "legitimate claim of entitlement to continued 
employment"); Trivoli v. Multnomah County Rural Fire Dep % 703 P.2d 285, 287 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1985) (properly interest in employment is substantive; employee must have 
reasonable expectation of tenure "at the time he was hired"). 
Further, whether there is a statutory right to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106fs due 
process procedures is determined by whether the public employee is a merit employee or 
at-will under § 10-3-1105. Accordingly, the relevant controversy as to the issue on appeal 
is not that the City terminated Mr. Pearson; the controversy instead is whether a statutory 
right to due process pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 attached at the time the City 
hired Mr. Pearson. If statutory rights to due process under § 10-3-1106 did attach at the 
time Mr. Pearson was hired, he would be entitled to due process procedures before he 
could be terminated. If such statutory rights did not attach at that time, statutory due 
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process rights under § 10-3-1106 could attach only if there was a later substantive statute 
which gave Mr. Pearson such rights retroactively. 
The statutory terms of Mr. Pearson's employment in the City's police department 
were set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 as it existed at the time he was hired. 
Under that version of § 10-3-1105, Mr. Pearson was at-will and had no statutory due 
process rights. By failing to address or consider the version of § 10-3-1105 under which 
the City hired Mr. Pearson, the court effectively applied retroactively and without 
question the version of § 10-3-1105 that was in effect when Mr. Pearson was terminated. 
This would have been understandable if the legislature had indicated that the 2004 
statutory amendments to § 10-3-1105 could bt applied retroactively, but the legislature 
did not so state. Utah law of many decades makes clear that a statute or statutory 
amendment may not be applied retroactively unless it specifically states that it is 
retroactive. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 ("A provision of the Utah Code is not 
retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive."). There is 
nothing in § 10-3-1105 that "expressly declares" that the 2004 amendments are to apply 
retroactively. 
It also is well-settled that, absent a legislative statement of retroactive application, 
a statutory amendment should never be applied retroactively if it "substantively modifies" 
the prior version of the statute. See, e.g., Harvey v. Cedar Hills, 2010 UT 12, fflf 2, 16-17, 
227 P.3d 256. "Substantively modifies" is related to whether the "substantive law" is 
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modified by the amendment. See id. at ^  25. The "substantive law" is defined as "the 
'positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties and 
which may give rise to a cause of action.'" Id. This is shown in Harney v. Cedar Hills, 
where the Court determined that a later statute had substantively modified the earlier 
statute because "the two versions of the statute" were "substantively different with regard 
to the relative standards for disconnection." Id. at \ 31. 
The definition of "substantially modifies" shows the flaw in Mr. Pearson's 
statement to the district court in oral argument that § 10-3-1105 "is an affirmative statute, 
meaning that it simply bestows on certain individuals additional rights, but that it doesn't 
take away anybody's rights or mandate the at will status of any employee. Under that 
interpretation, my client's position then would be simply unaffected by the statute.. .." 
See R. 384-85. Viewed in the context of well-settled law, this statement by Mr. Pearson 
improperly focuses only on Mr. Pearson's rights. It ignores that the City had substantive 
rights that were defined by the pre-2004 version of § 10-3-1105, because at the time the 
City hired Mr. Pearson as "a member" of its police department, it had no statutory 
obligation, duty, or responsibility to treat Mr. Pearson as a merit employee. 
The foregoing also shows the flaw in Mr. Pearson's response to the City's oral 
argument, i.e., the City argued that when Mr. Pearson was hired in 2002, "it was the 
earlier statute we were looking at and all members of the police department were at will 
under Section 10-3-1105." R. 397. Addressing this statement, Mr. Pearson argued to the 
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district court that pre-2004 Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 is not particularly relevant to the 
termination issue and instead is more relevant to his (still-pending) claims that he is not 
an at-will employee due to alleged oral and/or verbal contract(s) with the City. See R. 
400-01. 
Utah law also makes clear that an amendment can be applied retroactively only 
when: "(1) the legislative change merely 'clarifies] the meaning of the earlier 
enactment/ or (2) the amendment changed the law in a procedural way that does not 
effect the substantive rights of the parties." Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, \ 41, 234 P.3d 
1105 (citations omitted). The 2004 amendments to § 10-3-1105 clearly are not 
"procedural," nor do they "clarify the meaning of the earlier enactment." Instead, those 
amendments were substantive and affected the substantive rights of certain 
municipalities, because they dictated that those municipalities no longer could treat all 
police department "members" as at-will, with the exception of the employee categories 
indicated. 
In short, prior to May 3,2004, the City clearly had the right to treat Mr. Pearson as 
an at-will employee under the version of the statute in effect when he was hired, since the 
"rights" established in pre-2004 Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 included a municipality's 
right not to treat police department employees as merit employees, as well as a 
municipality's substantive right to terminate such employees without "cause." That same 
right of the City to treat Mr. Pearson as an at-will employee continued despite the 2004 
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amendments, because there is no retroactivity provision in the 2004 amendments and the 
amendments are substantive. 
Even if the issue of Mr. Pearson's being hired under a version of § 10-3-1105 that 
made him an at-will employee had not been raised with the district court, which it was, 
under the plain error rule the issue should be addressed here. See, e.g., Utah Chapter of 
the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd, 2009 UT 76, ffif 25-29, 226 P.3d 719 (discussing plain 
error); State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989) (same). "Plain error" means 
that the error must be plain to the district court, and the error must affect the substantial 
rights of the party arguing it. See Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35. Furthermore, "[a]s a matter 
of law, a trial court does not have the discretion to exceed the limits of the law. Doing so, 
by definition, is error." State v. Beck, 2007 UT 60, % 10, 165 P.3d 1225. "To show the 
obviousness of the error, the [party claiming it] must show that the law governing the 
error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." Id. at f 11. 
In this matter, the error was or should have been obvious to the district court, since 
both versions of the statute were submitted to the district court and discussed there, yet 
the court addressed only the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105. Further, one of the 
basic tenets of Utah law is that a statute cannot be applied retroactively except under 
certain conditions. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3. The district court knew that when Mr. 
Pearson was hired he was an at-will employee under statute, and knew that the statute that 
made him at-will was amended in 2004 and that this later statute wras the one on which 
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Mr. Pearson relied for his alleged due process rights as a merit employee under 
§ 10-3-1106. See Nature of Case, ffij 2, 21, 24-25, 27, 30; Facts ffif 2-4, sz^ra. Despite 
this, the district court apparently adopted Mr. Pearson's argument that the pre-2004 
version of § 10-3-1105 was not particularly important except to Mr. Pearson's contract 
claims. This is error under Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3, and it should have been obvious to 
the district court that there was no retroactivity statement in the May 3, 2004 version of § 
10-3-1105 and that the 2004 amendments were substantive. 
Moreover, the district court's not addressing this issue was harmful to the City 
because there is at least a reasonable chance that the outcome on the cross-motions for 
summary judgment would have been different if the court had assessed both versions of § 
10-3-1105. See Sierra Club, 2009 UT 76,128, 226 P.3d 719 (discussing plain error). 
In sum, the district court erred in not addressing both the pre-2004 and the post-
2004 versions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 in the context of Mr. Pearson's 
employment. Since this is strictly a question of law, and the facts are not in dispute, the 
City requests that this Court address and correct the district court's obvious and plain 
error. 
2. Mr. Pearson Was an At-Will Employee under the Amendments to Utah 
Code Ann. §10-3-1105. 
Mr. Pearson also is an at-will employee under the version of Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105 in effect at the time the City terminated him. 
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As argued above, § 10-3-1105 generally governs which municipal employees are 
at-will under Utah statute and which are merit employees. An assessment of the May 3, 
2004 version of § 10-3-1105 shows that Mr. Pearson also was at-will under that version. 
That version of the statute states: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2)5 each employee of a 
municipality shall hold employment without limitation of time, being 
subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or 
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided in 
Section 10-3-1106: 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person exercising 
executive power in the municipality; 
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire 
department in a first or second class city;4 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
(I) a superintendent; 
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality; or 
(k) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2). Mr. Pearson contends that when he was terminated, the 
amended version of § 10-3-1105 applied, and he was not an at-will employee under the 
4Police and fire department employees in Utah cities of the first and second class 
that have a civil sendee commission are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1001 
through-1013. 
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amended version because his title was "assistant police chief and not "deputy police 
chief." This argument should be rejected. 
a. Interpreting the May 3,2004 Version of Section 10-3-1105. 
This Court should look beyond the plain language of amended § 10-3-1105 in 
construing the statute because the statute is ambiguous. When construing a statute, courts 
do not "look beyond the plain language of [the] provision" unless the court "fmd[s] some 
ambiguity in it." Utah Pub. Employees Ass 'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, f 59,131 P.3d 208 
(citations omitted). The essence of "ambiguity" is a provision's having "two or more 
plausible meanings." See id. at ^ f 60. To determine whether "two or more plausible 
meanings" exist, a court considers the plain language of a provision and also reads the 
"text of the statute as a whole" and "interprets] its provisions in harmony with other 
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters," i.e.: 
. . . determining whether there are two or more plausible meanings depends 
not only on the text of the particular provision at issue, but also on the text 
of the statute as a whole. Indeed, "[w]e 'read the plain language of the 
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other 
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.'" As a result, a statute 
susceptible to competing interpretations may nevertheless be unambiguous 
if the text of the act as a whole, in light of related statutory provisions, 
makes all but one of those meanings implausible. When viewing the act as 
a whole does not eliminate duplicative yet plausible meanings, the statute is 
ambiguous, and we may resort to extrinsic interpretive tools to resolve the 
ambiguity. 
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Id. (internal citations omitted). When construing statutes, the court should attempt to give 
effect to the legislature's intent, and a court should not "follow the literal language of a 
statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result": 
Above all, this court's primary objective in construing enactments is to give 
effect to the legislature's intent. To discern legislative intent, "we look first 
to the statute's plain language." "We read the plain language of the statute 
as a whole [] and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in 
the same chapter and related chapters." When the plain meaning of the 
statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are 
needed. However, "a court should not follow the literal language of a 
statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result." 
LPIServ. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41,1f 11, 215 P.3d 135 (citations omitted). 
When a provision contains ambiguity or uncertainty, the court should select the 
interpretation that "best harmonizes" with the "general purpose" of the statute: 
where there is an ambiguity or uncertainty in a portion of a statute . . . and 
if it is easily susceptible of different interpretations, the one should be 
chosen which best harmonizes with its [the statute's] general purpose. 
Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
Application of these standards here shows that: (1) the term "a deputy police 
chief is ambiguous in the context of § 10-3-1105 and as shown by reference to statutes in 
the same and related chapters, (2) construing "a deputy police chief solely as a title and 
not as a hierarchal position/category "works an absurd result," and (3) a police 
department's second-in-command is at-will under § 10-3-1105 no matter what title a 
municipality gives to that position. 
12 
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b. The Term "A Deputy" in Section 10-3-1105 Is Ambiguous. 
The City's position is that considering the "plain language of the statute as a 
whole," and "interpreting] its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same 
chapter and related chapters," shows that the word "deputy" is ambiguous and is 
susceptible of more than one meaning. It can be the literal title "deputy," or it can be a 
hierarchal position/category, regardless of title, of an employee who is closely aligned 
with the "head of a municipal department" and has authority to assume or exercise the 
position of the head, i.e., a second-in-command. This rationale is consistent with the 
question of why, under the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105(2), would certain 
positions (or titles) be excluded from merit status and made at-will. The only logical 
reason for this is to exclude those positions that amount to a second-in-command, since a 
second-in-command is closely aligned with the department head's policy-making 
responsibility and decisions. For example, "a deputy of a head of a municipal 
department," which is one exclusion in § 10-3-1105, could only mean a catch-all 
hierarchal category/position of a second-in-command in any municipal department, 
inasmuch as the "municipal department" is unidentified. See Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105(h) (excluding from merit status "a deputy of a head of a municipal 
department"). 
By contrast, Mr. Pearson's position is that the "title" given in the May 3, 2004 
version of § 10-3-1105 trumps any other analysis, and that plain language must prevail. 
13 
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This is illogical. Accepting Mr. Pearson's "title" analysis would mean that a "marshal" in 
a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class would be a merit employee under the May 3, 2004 
version of § 10-3-1105 simply because the title "marshal" is not excluded by 
§ 10-3-1105fs plain language. By the same "title" analysis, "a police chief would be at-
will even though a "marshal" of a police department is the same thing as a "police chief." 
See Utah Code Ann., § 10-3-918 & -919 (equating "police chief with "marshal" in cities 
of second, third, fourth classes). This type of analysis was rejected in Ward v. Richfield 
City, 116 P.2d 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), which examined the pre-2004 version of § 10-3-
1105, which had excluded from merit status all "members of police departments]." In 
Ward, this Court rejected the position of the "City Marshall" of Richfield City, who had 
argued that he was a merit employee and not at-will under § 10-3-1105 because his title 
was "city marshal with appointed assistants." This court found no merit in this argument, 
noting that sections of Title 10 use the terms "chief of police" and "city marshal" 
interchangeably. Id. at 97 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918). 
Similarly, accepting Mr. Pearson's analysis would mean that any chief law 
enforcement officer would be a merit employee in a city of the third, fourth, and fifth 
class (as well as in a city of the first and second class that chose not to have a civil service 
commission) if that person did not have the specific title of "police chief,"5 even though 
5It is significant to the interpretation of the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105 
that the Utah Code does not address or dictate how municipalities "title" their main law 
enforcement agency, or its hierarchy or positions. 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that person might be appointed and be a policy-maker. Interpreting the statute to permit 
this distinction would "work an absurd result." 
Furthermore, construing "deputy" in § 10-3-1105 as a plain language title and not 
as a hierarchal category/position creates ambiguities and absurd results when compared 
with other statutes in the same or related chapters. For example, a statute in the same 
chapter states that "[t]he chief of police or marshal in each city of the third, fourth, or fifth 
class or town . . . may, with the consent of the person or body that appointed the chief or 
marshal, appoint assistants to the chief of police or marshal." See Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-918. Thus, the chief of police in such cities is not authorized to appoint "a deputy" 
and may only appoint an "assistant," even though the "assistant" clearly would be a 
designated second-in-command. Conversely, there presumably would be no prohibition 
on a chief of police in a city of the first or second class that did not have a civil service 
commission (and accordingly also was governed by Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105), with 
regard to appointing "deputies." 
Another statute gives certain powers, duties, and responsibilities to a "chief of 
police, marshals, and their assistants in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class." See § 
10-3-919 (referencing "powers, duties, and responsibilities" set forth in §§ 10-3-913 
through -915). Interestingly, no "powers, duties, and responsibilities" are given to a 
"deputy police chief by § 10-3-919. See also Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-913 through -
915. In fact, the only "police department" members referenced in these statutes are police 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
chiefs, assistant police chiefs, and "police officers." See id. The word "deputy" is not 
used for a specific police department employee; the only time that "deputy" is used is for 
a deputy sheriff. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1). 
Additional ambiguities and absurd results are created when Utah Code Ann. § 
53-13-103 is viewed in context with the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105. Section 53-
13-103 states that a "'[l]aw enforcement officer' specifically includes the following:... 
(i) any sheriff, deputy sheriff, chief of police, police officer, or marshal of any county, 
city, or town." See Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103. Thus, under § 53-13-103, "assistant 
police chief is not listed as a titled "law enforcement officer" under Utah law, despite the 
fact that a police chief can appoint only "assistants" under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918. 
Ambiguity and absurd results also arise when comparing § 10-3-1105 with the 
Utah Criminal Code at Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6, which deals with electronic 
communications and surveillance and is captioned as "[njotifying subscriber or customer 
of court order." Section 77-23b-6 does not list "deputy police chief as a supervisory 
position, but does list "assistant police chief as a supervisory position. As used in that 
section, "supervisory official" is "the investigative agent in charge or assistant 
investigative agent in charge or an equivalent of an investigative agency's headquarters 
or regional office; a county sheriff or chief deputy sheriff or police chief or assistant 
police chief...." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6 (l)(f) (emphasis added). Thus, under this 
statute "chief deputy sheriff appears as the equivalent of "assistant police chief." 
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Perhaps the most absurd result and ambiguity is that "a deputy police chief and 
an "assistant police chief are at-will in first and second class cities with a civil service 
commission, whereas under the district court's reasoning in this case, only the title "a 
deputy police chief would be at-will in cities of the third, fourth, and fifth classes, as 
well as in cities of the first and second class that chose not to have a civil service 
commission. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002(1) with id § 10-3-1105 (eff. May 3, 
2004). To add to this absurd result, only the title "deputy fire chief is at-will in cities of 
the first and second class with a civil service commission, but under the district court's 
reasoning in this case, both titles "a deputy fire chief and "assistant fire chief are at-will 
in cities of the third, fourth, and fifth class, as well as in cities of the first and second class 
without a civil service commission. See id. 
In light of the foregoing, the district court erred in finding that there is no 
ambiguity with regard to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. 
c. "Deputy" in Section 10-3-1105 Should Be Interpreted as Second-
in-Command. 
Because the term "deputy" in § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous, it can be interpreted 
through extrinsic evidence. It should be found here that "a deputy" should be interpreted 
as the second-in-command, and that Mr. Pearson was at-will under § 10-3-1105(2)(d) 
because his position equated to and was the same as "a deputy police chief as defined. 
Section 10-3-1105 reflects that "deputy police chief can reasonably be understood 
as second-in-command, since it also includes "a deputy of a head of a municipal 
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department" as a non-protected "at-will" employee, i.e., the second-in-command in a 
municipal department is included. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2)(h). As discussed 
previously, this analysis of terms based on job responsibilities is reflected in Ward v. 
Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). At issue in Ward was the pre-2004 
version of § 10-3-1105, which excluded from merit status all "members of police 
department^]." An employee of defendant Richfield City contended that he was a merit 
employee and not at-will because his title was "city marshal with appointed assistants." 
This Court rejected this argument, and held that the employee could not evade 
§ 10-3-1105's exclusion of "members of police department," since other sections of Title 
10 use the terms "chief of police" and "city marshal" interchangeably. Id. at 97 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918). Ward's analysis also can be used here, since other parts of 
Title 10 use assistant police chief for what clearly is the second-in-command in a police 
department. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-918 & -919. 
Moreover, despite the district court's ultimate conclusion, its definitional analysis 
of § 10-3-1105 actually supports that Mr. Pearson is an at-will employee. Indeed, while 
rejecting the idea of ambiguity, the district court actually illustrated it in its Memorandum 
Decision, which states: 
The word "deputy" is defined as "a person appointed as a substitute 
with power to act," and a "second in command or assistant who usually 
takes charge when his or her superior is absent." Mirriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). The word "assistant" is a person who 
assists, a helper. Black's Law Dictionary defines "deputy" as "[a] 
substitute; a person duly authorized by an officer to exercise some or all of 
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the functions pertaining to the office, in the place and stead of the latter." 
As these terms are commonly understood, an assistant is "one who assists," 
whereas a deputy is "A person named or empowered to act for another." 
The word "deputy" thus encompasses someone not only who assists 
someone else, but someone who, with greater authority, may conduct the 
business of another. From an organizational standpoint, other portions of 
the Code suggest that the distinction has hierarchical implications, [citing 
e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002(3).]. Accordingly, while there are some 
similarities in the meanings of these terms, they are not interchangeable and 
are separate and distinct, and the court does not in the context of this statute 
find that the word "deputy" is ambiguous. 
R. 227-28. See also R. 391 (City defines "deputy" at oral argument as a "substitute, a 
person duly authorized by an officer to exercise some or all of the functions pertaining to 
the office in the place and stead of the latter"). In failing to see the ambiguity in the 
statute, the district court did not address that "a deputy" can be viewed as a 
category/position, and not simply the specific title. If Mr. Pearson's position with the 
City had been viewed as a category/position and not simply a title, he would have been "a 
deputy" under the statute because his job description is consistent with the definition of 
"deputy" cited by the district court. By contrast, Mr. Pearson's job description shows that 
he was not simply an "assistant" as defined by the district court. 
Indeed, the definition of "deputy" cited by the district court is a definition of a 
second-in-command. In this context, the City had pointed out to the district court that the 
legislature's use of the indefinite article "a" to reference "a deputy" instead of the definite 
article "the," is indicative of the intent of the legislature to view "a deputy" as a hierarchal 
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category/position, and not just a plain-language title. The City pointed out at oral 
argument that: 
the statute doesn't say "the deputy police chief," it says "a deputy of [sic] 
police chief." . . . it's the indefinite article that's used "a" rather than "the." . 
.. suggesting that it's a category, "a" deputy, not "the" deputy, but "a" 
deputy. Now, if you look at—again, at the text of the statute as a whole, not 
just the plain language of that line, you see that the legislature has identified 
a whole category of people who are at will and these are the deputies of 
heads of a municipal department. Again, indicating, when you look at the 
statute as a whole, it — the legislature intended for a category-type, or 
position-type approach. 
R. 392-93. As discussed above, this is borne out in Utah's Criminal Code, which uses the 
term "assistant police chief for what certainly is a "deputy" as defined by the district 
court. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6(l)(f) (electronic surveillance). It also is reflected 
in the Utah statute that allows a police chief in cities of the third, fourth, and fifth classes 
to appoint "assistants." See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918. 
Policy considerations also dictate that "a deputy police chief in Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1105 should be construed as the category/position of second-in-command. For 
example, in the same statute, "a deputy" clearly is used to mean second-in-command in an 
unidentified "department." See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2)(h). Furthermore, the 
positions/categories made at-will by § 10-3-1105 suggest that the legislature intends to 
limit § 10-3-1106 due process entitlement to employees who are not in policy making or 
policy implementing positions and who are not directly involved in a meaningful and 
significant way with running a municipal department. 
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Based on these standards, Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. Mr. Pearson, City 
Manager Horst5 and others testified that Mr. Pearson was second-in-command in the 
City's police department, and organizational charts show the position was second-in-
c mi\ ma nd Set ? Facts ^ 5-10 1 2 1 II Fhe Cit:> h a ci no ,;depi it) ' 'police c liief \ See id 
This means that the hierarchal category/position "a der • ponce ch lef in § i 11-1- II105 
would be the same as assistant police chief in the City's specific law enforcement 
departmental structure. 
r;
 ; ^ I : .;, . A- .;.. . - w . .„•
 s secona-m-
command and in a policy making/polic\ --r-- .r *-: ;.;. .-i •* -
in the development of departmental programs," and "[a]ssumes departmental 
responsibility in the absence of the Chief of Police." See Facts f^ 7 The position also 
"pro\ ides genei al supei v ision to all department personnel, directly and through 
subordinate supervisors," and: (I) "oversees [the] qualily of overall departmental 
performance management functions"; (2) "assists in the development and implementation 
of quality control guidelines"; (3) "makes recommendations for changes in policies and 
pn i-eeJuies. and implements changes upon approval"; (4) "represents] the Police 
Department as public meetings as necessary"; Jiul i M "sels (sic) on (Ihe] regional counu 
training board." See Facts fflf 6-7. 
In sum, the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous because it can have 
tv :»mailings- the exact title, or a hierarchal position/category of persons who fit "a 
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deputy" definition. Interpreting "a deputy" as a hierarchal position/category of those who 
are second-in-command in a law enforcement agency would effect the intent of the 
legislature regarding policy-making/implementing positions. 
3. Mr. Pearson Was At-Will Because He Was a "Deputy of a Head of a 
Municipal Department." 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Pearson also is excluded from due process coverage 
under the 2004 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 because as assistant police 
chief, he was "a deputy of a head of a municipal department" under § 10-3-1105(2)(h). 
Under the 2004 amendments, "a head of a municipal department" is also at-will. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2)(g). Since no department is identified in 
§ 10-3-1105(2)(g) or (h), these can be viewed as catch-all provisions in which exact titles 
(i.e., plain language) are not relevant. This kind of analysis permits ambiguities or 
inconsistencies in § 10-3-1105 that might be created by a municipality's using a different 
"title," to comply with and effect the legislature's intent. For example, to apply this to a 
municipal police department headed by a "marshal" would mean that the marshal was not 
a merit employee even though the exact title "marshal" is not used in § 10-3-1105 for the 
head of a police department. 
Mr. Pearson's position in the district court was that "a deputy of a head of a 
municipal department" is not a "catch-all" provision, and refers only to the fact that a 
municipality may create a new department not previously considered. See R. 398. The 
district court's position regarding a "catch-all" provision was that to apply "deputy of a 
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head o f a municipal department" to Mr. Pearson's posit ion w o u l d " read a redi indancy into 
the statute." See R. 2 2 8 . These arguments are undermined by Ward's marshal/pol ice 
chief issue, by the fact that Utah statute al lows a pol ice ch ie f to appoint only assistants, as 
vv t II as 1: y othe r statiit.es, For example, undei § 10 3 918. a ''marshal" Is an acceptable 
term and a person in that pos i t ion c l ea rh v;m be t h r he;nl of a pnlire dcpartirici ml m ILiw 
enforcement agency. Mr. Pearson's proposed plain language analysis would mean that 
the marshal is a merit employee under § 10-3-1105. However, if "marshal" is viewed 
under § 1 0-3-11 05(g) as " 'a head of a. municipal department," a marshal, l ike a po l i ce 
ch ief, Is at-will 
Section 10-3-1105(h) should be v i e w e d as a catch-all that wi l l capture second-in-
command "positions" regardless o f the title for a posit ion that a municipality uses . F o r 
example, as head uf the po l i ce department, the City's po l i ce ch ie f is "head o f a municipal 
depar tmen t . " As lha^sist:inl.M Mr Pears* MI \\;is k\\ iJepuh «»l .i bead H * J nu i inu |Ml 
department" because he w a s second- in-command. Thus, the exact titles are - ,* -vl \ -; 
Moreover, in the instant case, the City's po l ice chief had another t i t le . I h e City 
had placed the po l ice and fire departments under the Department o f Public Safety. See 
F H I I " ^ l 4-7 1 inilsa) Shepherd vuts identified in I he I Vpar lment n( Puh lk Saie t ) "s • 
letterhead stationary as "Director," and Mr. Pearson w a s identified as "Chief o f Pol ice 
Operations." Facts f 9. A s Director o f Public Safety, Lindsay Shepherd w a s also a "head 
o f a municipal department," and Mr. Pearson w a s at-will because as assistant po l ice chief 
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and Chief of Police Operations, Mr. Pearson was a "deputy of a head of a municipal 
department." 
In sum, the 2004 version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous, including 
when viewed in context with other Utah statutes dealing with law enforcement. To 
reconcile these ambiguities, the Court should find that "a deputy" is a hierarchal 
position/category meaning a second-in-command, and that as assistant police chief, Mr. 
Pearson was an at-will employee. 
CONCLUSION 
South Jordan City respectfully asks this Court to find that the district court erred in 
finding that Mr. Pearson was a merit employee under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Given the unusual posture of this case and the unusual legal issues raised, as well 
as the fact that the case is significant to numerous municipalities in Utah because of their 
own law enforcement agency "titles," South Jordan City requests oral argument to assist 
the Court in more fully understanding its position. 
DATED this jf%_ day of February, 2011. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
— > 
f ' ! 
By:_^ 
'-Wclith D. Wolferts 
Attorneys for South Jordan City 
lie IN. Jonnson 
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a. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2002 Version) 
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§10-3-1105 
d. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002 
e. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 
f. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 
g. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918 
h. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3 -919 
i. Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103 
j . Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6 
k. Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-3 
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 
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MUNIr [p^i, r;r ^VE^N M E N T 
that would have accrued during the period beginning with the establishment 
of the system and ending with the election had the librarian, assistants and 
employees been included within the system from its establishment. 
History: C. 1953, 10-3-1104, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Prerequisites. 
Before library employees were eligible to par-
ticipate in city plan under prior law, the library 
board had to take proper action consisting of at 
least two separate and distinct acts: (1) Pass 
necessary resolutions permitting employees to 
participate; and (2) provide funds necessary for 
cost of participation. Taft v. Glade, 114 Utah 
435, 201 P.2d 285 (1948), 
&0O3* Version 
10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees — Duration 
and termination of term of office. 
All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members 
of the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and 
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation of time, being 
subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided. 
History: C. 1953,10-3-1105, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction. 
De facto officer. 
Duration of term. 
Removal; 
—Council to concur. 
—Right to appeal. 
—Who holds power. 
—Without cause. 
Construction. 
The language "as hereinafter provided" in 
this section specifically refers to the sections 
that follow. Therefore, "any officer" in § 10-3-
1106 must mean any officer not excluded in this 
section. Ward v. Richfield City, 776. P.2d 93 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 
1990). 
De facto officer. 
Where the person in possession of a city office 
is at most only a de facto officer, he is subject to 
removal at any time and is not in a position to 
complain of the city council's action abolishing 
office. McAllister v. Swan, 16 Utah 1, 50 P. 812 
(1897). 
Duration of term. 
City marshal's term will not in any event last 
beyond the next municipal election even though 
no successor be appointed. Taylor v. Gunderson , 
107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944). 
Removal. 
—Council to concur. 
The consent of a majority of the council is 
necessary for removal of officer. State ex rel. 
Breeden v. Sheets, 26 Utah 105, 72 P. 334 
(1903). 
Assuming that the city marshal was right-
fully holding office, the attempt by the mayor to 
remove him without the concurrence of the 
council was wholly ineffectual. Henriod v. 
Church, 52 Utah 134, 172 P. 701 (1918). 
—Right to appeal. 
The legislature intended specifically to ex-
clude a chief of police, and hence "head" of a 
police "department," from the appeal provisions 
of § 10-3-1106. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 
757 (Utah 1990). 
—Who holds power. 
When this section is read in connection with 
former § 10-6-30 (see present § 10-3-916), it 
will be seen that the same authorities who have 
the power of appointment, the mayor and city 
council, have the power of removal. Taylor v. 
Gunderson, 107 Utah 437,154 P.2d 653 (1944). 
—Without cause. 
It is the legislative intent that a city marshal 
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10-3-1106 UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE 
in cities of the third class may be removed 
without cause. Taylor v. Gunderson, 107 Utah 
437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal for discharge of civil sen'ice employee having 
Corporations, Etc. § 255. permanent status, 4 A.L.R.3d 488. 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations Determination as to good faith in abolition of 
§§ 496 to 501, 552, 719. public service or employment subject to civil 
A.L.R. — Pre-employment conduct as ground service or merit system, 87 A.L.R.3d 1165. 
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer — Appeals — Board — 
Procedure, 
(1) No officer or employee covered by Section 10-3-1105 shall be discharged 
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his politics or 
religious belief, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective 
officers, governing body, or heads of departments. In all cases where any officer 
or employee is discharged or transferred from one position to another for any 
reason, he shall have the right to appeal the discharge or transfer to a board 
to be known as the appeal board which shall consist of five members, three of 
whom shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers and employees, and 
two of wThom shall be members of the governing body. 
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the 
recorder within ten days after the discharge or transfer. Upon the filing of the 
appeal, the city recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to the appeal 
board. Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal 
board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence 
and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the 
discharge or transfer. 
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented 
by counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront the witness whose testimony, 
is to be considered, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal, 
board. 
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the 
officer or employee may have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing, 
body whose decision shall be final. In the event the appeal board does not 
uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further 
proceedings shall be had. 
(5) The decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be 
certified to the recorder with 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it.' 
The board may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his 
salary for the period of time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency, 
in salary for the period he was transferred to a position of less remuneration1" 
but not to exceed a 15 day period. In no case shall the appointive officer or 
employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon 
a concurrence of at least a majority of the membership of the governing body 
of the municipality. 
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge, or 
transfer, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and 
also to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. The 
employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day 
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t I.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-1105 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
* 1 Chapter 3. Municipal Government 
11 Part 11. Personnel Rules and Benefits 
# § 10-3-1105. Municipal employees—Duration and termination of employment -
Exceptions 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold employment 
without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or 
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106. 
12 ) S u b s e ct" o n ( 1 ) » ' < , «-••" s r > o i" ^ p p I y i" <)'. 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive power in the 
municipality; 
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a member of the 
classified civil service in a first or second class city; 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
i • 
r a ;epv* ;• assistant r re :r.'--- if the municipality; 
(g) a head of a mi micipal department; 
(I i) a clepi it:1"1] oil ' a I \ee ::l of a i i n m Hcipal depai ti i neii it; 
(i) a superintendent; 
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality; 
(k) a p a i 1: "I: i i i i e e i i i p I o > e e o f t I i e i m i 
(!) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a niunicipality's ability to 
define cause for an employee termination or reduction in force. 
CREDIT(S) 
L a\ s 1 9: ' 1 1 8, § 3; Laws 2004 f c. 260, Q ±, erf. May 3, 2004. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Utah's justice court system, a legal charade. Mike Martinez, 22 Utah B.J, 27 (March/April, 2009). 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Municipal Corporations <ft»149(l), 217.6. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 268k l49 ( l ) ; 268k217.6. 
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations 55 361, 601, 604, 608 to 611, 615, 611 to 619. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
ALR Library 
125 A,L.R. 263, Constitutionality and Construction, as to Nature of Review, of Statute Providing for 
Appeal to or Review by Court, as Regards Order of Civil Service Commission. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Abolishment of office 2 
City marshals 8 
De facto officers 5 
Department heads 4 




Removal of employees 6 
Termination 10 
1. Due process 
Plaintiff, having been fired from his job as director of parks for city in Utah, had no property interest 
in his job warranting due process protection under Utah law but did have liberty interest, and due 
process remedy was an opportunity to refute the charge, his right being one which arose because 
there was danger of foreclosure of the community, due to derogatory reasons for being fired. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amends. 1. 5, 14; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 12(b)(6), 59, 59(e), 28 U.S.C.A.; 42 U.S.C.A. 5 
1983; U.C.A.1953, 10-3-1105. Eames v. City of Logan, Utah, 1985, 762 F.2d 83. Constitutional Law 
%^ 4171; Constitutional Law <^ 4173(3) 
Police department employee had a recognized property right in his job, and thus, city was required to 
follow adequate due process procedures in connection with termination of his employment. Becker v. 
Sunset City, 2009, 216 P.3d 367, 635 Utah Adv. Rep. 29r 2009 UT App 197. Constitutional Law <^ 
4172(6); Municipal Corporations o» 185(3) 
2. Abolishment of office 
Under 1 Comp. Laws Utah 1888, § 312, the municipality of Salt Lake City had the right to create the 
office of inspector of provisions; and where a municipality has the power to create an office, it has, in 
the absence of legislative restraint, the right to abolish it. McAllister v. Swan, 1897, 16 Utah 1, 50 P. 
812. Municipal Corporations c^ 126 
3. Incumbents 
A de facto incumbent of a public office is subject to removal at any time, and cannot complain of an 
act by which such office is abolished. McAllister v. Swan, 1897, 16 Utah 1, 50 P. 812. Officers And 
Public Employees <c^  67 
Where the incumbent of a public office assumes to act after the office has been abolished, he has no 
legal claim against the municipality for services so performed. McAllister v. Swan, 1897, 16 Utah 1, 
50 P, 812. Municipal Corporations £~ 162.4 
4. Department heads 
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Text. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted. 
Ch. 260 (S.B. 23) 
WEST'S NO. 233 
AMENDMENTS TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
This bill modifies provisions of the Utah Municipal Code relating to municipal officers and employees. This 
bill modifies the officers and employees of a municipality to whom certain provisions relating to the duration 
of employment and appeals from employment decisions apply; modifies the composition of an appeal board 
for employment decisions; modifies the process for appealing an action or decision of the appeal board; ex-
pands circumstances covered by provisions relating to limitations on taking negative employment action; re-
quires rather than permits the appeal board to provide that an employee receive back salary if the board finds 
in favor of the employee; and makes technical changes. 
Utah Code Sections Affected: 
AMENDS: 
10 :i 1105, as enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah. 1977 
10-3-1106, as enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1977 
Be it enacted by the I legislature of the state of I Italii 
Section 1. Section 10- 3-1105 is amended to read; 
« U T S T § 10-3-1105 » 
§ 10 3- 1105. Municipal employees—Duration and termination of employment—Exceptions. 
AH appointive officers and employees of municipality > <^  .^ JLV,. > 
partments, heads of departments, and superintendents, 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold their employment without 
limitation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided., suspension of over two 
days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided in Section 
10-3-1106. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive power in the municipality; 
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(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a member of the classified civil 
service in a first or second class city; 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
(i) a superintendent; 
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality; 
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or 
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a municipality's ability to define 
cause for an employee termination or reduction in force. 
Section 2. Section 10-3-1106 is amended to read: 
« U T S T § 10-3-1106 » 
§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer—Appeals—Board—Procedure. 
(1) No officer or An employee covered by to which Section 1 0 - 3 - 1 1 0 5 shall applies may not be discharged, 
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration: 
(a) because of his the employee's politics or religious belief,; or 
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments. In 
all cases where any officer or 
(2)(a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily transferred 
from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, he shall have the right to the employee may, 
subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to 
be known as the appeal board which shall consist of five members, three of whom shall be chosen by and from 
the appointive officers and employees, and two of whom shall be members of the governing body, established 
under Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the employee's 
rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board. 
(2) The (3)(a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the mu-
nicipal recorder within ten days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the final dispos-
ition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or involun-
tary transfer. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of the an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the city municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a 
copy of the same appeal to the appeal board. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence its in-
vestigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the 
discharge, suspension, or transfer. 
(3) The (4) An employee shall be entitled to who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may: 
(a) appear in person and to be represented by counsel, to; 
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(b) have a public hearing, to; 
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered,; and to 
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the officer or employee may have 14 days 
thereafter to appeal to the governing body whose decision shall be final. In the event the appeal board does not 
uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further proceedings shall be had. 
(5) The (a)(i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder 
with within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it. The board may, in its decision,, except as provided 
in Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of" 60 
days, if the employee and municipality both consent. 
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that an the employee shall receive his: 
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which he the employee is discharged, or suspended 
without pay; or 
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period he during which the employee was transferred to a position of less re-
muneration but not to exceed a 15 day period. In no case shall the appointive officer or employee be discharged 
or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon a concurrence of at least a majority' of the membership of 
the governing body of the municipality. 
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge, or transfer, the recorder shall certify the de-
cision to the employee affected, and also to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. 
The employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day following the certification by the 
recorder of the appeal board's decision, provided that the employee, or officer, concerned reports for his as-
signed duties during that next working day. 
(6)(a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing with that 
court a notice of appeal. 
(b) Each notice of appeal under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final ac-
tion or order of the appeal board. 
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the purpose of determining if 
the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
(7)(a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, and the number of members, the 
designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall 
be prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance, but the provisions for choosing the three 
members from the appointed officers and employees shall in no way restrict a free selection of members by the 
appointive officers and employees of the municipality. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under Part 12, 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that 
the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
Effective May 3,2004, 
Approved March 23,2004. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-1002 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
* 1 Chapter 3. Municipal Government 
* 1 Part 10. Civil Service Commission 
* § 10-3-1002. Classified civil service—Places of employment constituting classified 
civil service—Appointments to and from classified civil service 
(1) The classified civil service shall consist of all places of employment now existing or hereafter 
created in or under the police department and the fire department of each first or second class city 
that establishes a civil service commission and the health department in each first class city that 
establishes a civil service commission, except the head of the departments, deputy chiefs of the police 
and fire departments, and assistant chiefs of the police department in cities of the first and second 
class, and the members of the board of health of the departments. 
(2) No appointments to any of the places of employment constituting the classified civil service in the 
departments shall be made except according to law and under the rules and regulations of the civil 
service commission. 
(3) The head of each of the departments may, and the deputy chiefs of the police and fire 
departments and assistant chiefs of the police department shall, be appointed from the classified civil 
service, and upon the expiration of the term or upon the appointment of a successor shall be returned 
thereto. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 1977, c. 44, § 1 ; Laws 2001, c. 178, S 4, eff. April 30r 2001. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Demotion and Discharge of Municipal Employees in Utah. Kitzmiller, 16 Utah BJ . 20 (April 2003). 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Municipal Corporations 0*484(2), 191, 197. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 268kl84(2); 268k l91 ; 268kl97. 
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations 55 450 to 453, 474 to 476, 478 to 484, 505, 508, 535 to 538, 542, 
544 to 546, 548 to 552, 568 to 569. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-1002, UT ST § 10-3-1002 
Current through 2010 General Session, including results from the November 2010 General Election. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
*H Chapter 3. Municipal Government 
*! Part 10. Civil Service Commission 
-t § 10-3-1012. Suspension or discharge by department head-Appeal to commission—Hearing 
and decision 
(1) All persons in the classified civil service may be suspended as provided in Section 10-3-912, or removed 
from office or employment by the head of the department for misconduct, incompetency, failure to perform du-
ties, or failure to observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the suspended or dis-
charged person to the civil service commission. 
(2) Any person suspended or discharged may, within five days from the issuance by the head of the department 
of the order of suspension or discharge, appeal to the civil service commission, which shall fully hear and de-
termine the matter. 
(3) The suspended or discharged person shall be entitled to appear in person and to have counsel and a public 
hearing. 
(4) The finding and decision of the civil service commission upon the hearing shall be certified to the head of 
the department from whose order the appeal is taken, and shall be final and immediately enforced by the head. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 221, § 2; Laws 2001, c. 178, § 6, eff. April 30,2001. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Municipal Corporations €=> 218(3), 218(8), 218(9). 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 268k218(3); 268k218(8); 268k218(9). 
C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 599, 633, 635 to 636, 638 to 639, 641, 643 to 647. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Administrative review 20 
Breach of duty, grounds for suspension or discharge 10 
Cause, grounds for suspension or discharge 11 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
*i Chapter 3. Municipal Government 
*! Part 10. Civil Service Commission 
-t § 10-3-1012.5. Appeal to Court of Appeals-Scope of review 
Any final action or order of the commission may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for review. The notice of 
appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the issuance of the final action or order of the commission. The review by 
Court of Appeals shall be on the record of the commission and shall be for the purpose of determining if the 
commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1991, c. 221, § 3; Laws 2010, c. 378, § 139, eff. May 11, 2010. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Kitzmiller, Demotion and Discharge of Municipal Employees in Utah, 16 Utah B.J. 20 (April 2003). 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Municipal Corporations €=> 218(9). 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 268k218(9). 
CIS. Municipal Corporations §§ 633, 635 to 636, 638 to 639, 641, 644 to 647. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Certiorari 3 
Determination and disposition 4 
Due process 1 
Evidence considered 1.5 
Scope of review 2 
1. Due process 
Dismissal of former police officer's appeal of his employment termination for failure to comply with discovery 
requirements did not violate officer's due process right to a post-deprivation hearing before city civil service 
commission; officer not only ignored at least seven requests from the city over the course often months, and ad-
mitted fault in failing to produce the requested material but, thereafter, failed to avail himself of one final oppor-
tunity to comply with city's request for the documents. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Joseph v. Salt Lake City 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
*1 Chapter 3. Municipal Government 
*1 Part 9. Appointed Officials and Their Duties 
-+ § 10-3-918. Chief of police or marshal in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or town 
The chief of police or marshal in each city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or town: 
(1) shall: 
(a) exercise and perform the duties that are prescribed by the legislative body; 
(b) be under the direction, control, and supervision of the person or body that appointed the chief or marshal; and 
(c) on or before January 1,2003, adopt a written policy that prohibits the stopping, detention, or search of any 
person when the action is solely motivated by considerations of race, color, ethnicity, age, or gender; and 
(2) may, with the consent of the person or body that appointed the chief or marshal, appoint assistants to the 
chief of police or marshal. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 1983, c. 33, § 3; Laws 2001, c. 178, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 219, § 
2, eff. July 1, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 292, § 24, eff. May 5, 2003. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Municipal Corporations €^> 182, 183. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 268kl82; 268kl83. 
C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 450 to 453, 457 to 472, 474 to 476, 505, 508. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Judicial review 1 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
*! Chapter 3. Municipal Government 
*§ Part 9. Appointed Officials and Their Duties 
-f § 10-3-919. Powers, duties, and obligations of police chief, marshal, and their assistants in a 
city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or town 
The chief of police, marshals, and their assistants in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or town shall have 
all of the powers, rights, and duties respectively conferred on such officers in Sections 10-3-913 through 10-3-915. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 2003, c. 292, § 25, eff. May 5, 2003. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Municipal Corporations €^> 182, 183(5). 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 268kl82; 268kl 83(5). 
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 450 to 453, 457 to 466,471 to 472,474 to 476, 505, 508. 
U.CA. 1953 § 10-3-919, UT ST § 10-3-919 
Current through 2010 General Session, including results from the November 2010 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 53. Public Safety Code 
*i Chapter 13. Peace Officer Classifications (Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 53-13-103. Law enforcement officer 
(l)(a) "Law enforcement officer" means a sworn and certified peace officer who is an employee of a law en-
forcement agency that is part of or administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions, and whose 
primary and principal duties consist of the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal 
statutes or ordinances of this state or any of its political subdivisions. 
(b) "Law enforcement officer" specifically includes the following: 
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, chief of police, police officer, or marshal of any county, city, or town; 
(ii) the commissioner of public safety and any member of the Department of Public Safety certified as a 
peace officer; 
(iii) all persons specified in Sections 23-20-1.5 and 79-4-501; 
(iv) any police officer employed by any college or university; 
(v) investigators for the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division; 
(vi) special agents or investigators employed by the attorney general, district attorneys, and county attor- neys; 
(vii) employees of the Department of Natural Resources designated as peace officers by law; 
(viii) school district police officers as designated by the board of education for the school district; 
(ix) the executive director of the Department of Corrections and any correctional enforcement or investigat-
ive officer designated by the executive director and approved by the commissioner of public safety and cer-
tified by the division; 
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(x) correctional enforcement, investigative, or adult probation and parole officers employed by the Depart-
ment of Corrections serving on or before July 1,1993; 
(xi) members of a law enforcement agency established by a private college or university provided that the 
college or university has been certified by the commissioner of public safety according to rules of the De-
partment of Public Safety; 
(xii) airport police officers of any airport owned or operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions; and 
(xiii) transit police officers designated under Section 17B-2a-823. 
(2) Law enforcement officers may serve criminal process and arrest violators of any law of this state and have 
the right to require aid in executing their lawful duties. 
(3)(a) A law enforcement officer has statewide full-spectrum peace officer authority, but the authority extends to 
other counties, cities, or towns only when the officer is acting under Title 77, Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh 
Pursuit, unless the law enforcement officer is employed by the state. 
(b)(i) A local law enforcement agency may limit the jurisdiction in which its law enforcement officers may 
exercise their peace officer authority to a certain geographic area. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b)(i), a law enforcement officer may exercise his authority outside of 
the limited geographic area, pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, if the officer is 
pursuing an offender for an offense that occurred within the limited geographic area. 
(c) The authority of law enforcement officers employed by the Department of Corrections is regulated by Title 
64, Chapter 13, Department of Corrections-State Prison. 
(4) A law enforcement officer shall, prior to exercising peace officer authority, satisfactorily complete: 
(a) the basic course at a certified law enforcement officer training academy or pass a certification examination 
as provided in Section 53-6-206, and be certified; and 
(b) annual certified training of at least 40 hours per year as directed by the director of the division, with the 
advice and consent of the council. 
CREDIT(S) 
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Laws 1985, c. 174, § 3; Laws 1987, c. 69, § 9; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 58; Laws 1993, c. 38, § 86; Laws 1993, c. 
103, § 5; Laws 1993, c. 234. § 388; Laws 1997, c. 315, § 6, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 282, § 44, eff. Mav 
4, 1998; Laws 2001, c. 296, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2006, c. 347, § 2, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 
329, § 410, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 344, § 12, eff. May 12, 2009. 
Codifications C. 1953, § 77-la-l. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Renumbered from § 53-10-103 by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel to avoid duplication 
in numbering. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Concealed firearm, permit to carry, see § 53-5-704. 
County sheriff, additional qualifications, see § 17-22-1.5. 
Custodial sexual relations, misconduct, penalties and defenses, see § 76-5-412. 
Custodial sexual relations or misconduct with youth, see § 76-5-413. 
Education benefit plan for law enforcement and correctional officers, see § 67-19-12.2. 
Licensure, exemptions, see § 58-1-307. 
Park rangers, peace officer authority, see § 79-4-501. 
Peace officer, correctional officer, and public safety personnel pay plans, see § 67-19-12.3. 
Peace officers, training and certification, see § 53-6-201 et seq. 
Personal use of state vehicles for law enforcement officers, see § 67-5-233. 
Public Safety Code, see § 53-1-101 et seq. 
Public Safety Contributory Retirement Act, disputes over positions to be covered, see §§ 49-14-201 and 
49-15-201. 
Underinsured motorist coverage, application to this section, see § 31A-22-305.3. 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE REFERENCES 
Private colleges and universities, certification of law enforcement agencies within institutions, see Utah 
Admin. Code 698-4. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
States €==> 69. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 360k69. 
C.J.S. States §§ 120, 136. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Evidence wrongfully obtained 2 
Jurisdictional limit 1 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
KM Chapter 23B. Access to Electronic Communications 
-• § 77-23b-6. Notifying subscriber or customer of court order-Requested delay-Grounds-Limits 
(l)(a) The governmental entity acting under Subsection 77-23b-4 (2) may: 
(i) if a court order is sought, include in the application a request for an order delaying the notification re-
quirement under Subsection 77-23b-4(2) for not to exceed 90 days and, if the court determines there is reas-
on to believe that notification of existence of the court order may have an adverse result under Subsection 
(l)(b), the court shall grant the order; or 
(ii) if an administrative subpoena authorized by a state or federal statute or a state or federal grand jury sub-
poena is obtained, delay the notification required under Subsection 77-23b-4(2) for not to exceed 90 days, 
upon the execution of a written certification of a supervisory official that there is reason to believe that the 
notification of the existence of the subpoena may have an adverse result under Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) An adverse result under Subsection (l)(a) is: 
(i) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; 
(ii) flight from prosecution; 
(iii) destruction of or tampering with evidence; 
(iv) intimidation of potential witnesses; or 
(v) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial. 
(c) The governmental entity shall maintain a true copy of certification under Subsection (l)(a)(ii). 
(d) Extensions of the delay of notification under Section 77-23b-4 of up to 90 days each, may be granted by 
the court upon application, or by certification by a governmental entity, but only in accordance with Subsec-
tion (2). 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-23b-6 Page 2 
(e) On expiration of the period of delay of notification under Subsection (l)(a) or (d), the governmental entity 
shall serve upon, or deliver by registered or first class mail, to the customer or subscriber a copy of the process 
or request together with a notice: 
(i) stating with reasonable specificity the nature of the law enforcement inquiry; and 
(ii) informing the customer or subscriber: 
(A) that information maintained for the customer or subscriber by the service provider named in the pro-
cess or request was supplied to or requested by that governmental authority and the date the supplying or 
request took place; 
(B) that notification of the customer or subscriber was delayed; 
(C) which governmental entity or court made the certification or determination pursuant to which that 
delay was made; and 
(D) which provision of this chapter allows the delay. 
(f) As used in this subsection, "supervisory official" means the investigative agent in charge or assistant in-
vestigative agent in charge or an equivalent of an investigative agency's headquarters or regional office; a 
county sheriff or chief deputy sheriff, or police chief or assistant police chief; the officer in charge of an in-
vestigative task force or the assistant officer in charge; or the attorney general, an assistant attorney general, a 
county attorney or district attorney, a deputy county attorney or deputy district attorney, or the chief prosecut-
ing attorney of any political subdivision of the state. 
(2) A governmental entity acting under Section 77-23b-4, when not required to notify the subscriber or customer 
under Subsection 77-23b-4 (2)(a), or to the extent that it may delay notice under Subsection (1), may apply to a 
court for an order commanding the provider of electronic communications service or remote computing service 
to whom a warrant, subpoena, or court order is directed, for a period of time the court considers appropriate, to 
not notify any other person of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or court order. The court shall enter the or-
der if it determines that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or 
court order will result in: 
(a) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; 
(b) flight from prosecution; 
(c) destruction of or tampering with evidence; 
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(d) intimidation of potential witnesses; or 
(e) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1988, c. 251, § 20; Laws 1993, c. 38, § 101. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Telecommunications © ^ 528. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 372k528. 
C.J.S. Telegraphs, Telephones, Radio, and Television §§ 302 to 303. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-23b-6, UT ST § 77-23b-6 
Current through 2010 General Session, including results from the November 2010 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 68. Statutes 
*i Chapter 3. Construction 
-t § 68-3-3. Retroactive effect 
A provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive. 
CREDIT(S) 
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 2490; C.L. 1907, § 2490; C.L. 1917, § 5840; R.S. 1933, § 88-2-3; C. 1943, § 88-2-3. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2010, c. 254, § 7, rewrote the section, which formerly read: 
"No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Ex post facto laws or laws impairing contracts prohibited, see Const. Art. 1, § 18. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Statutes €^z> 262 to 263, 271. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 361k262 to 361k263; 361k271. 
C.J.S. Statutes §§ 408, 413, 415 to 416, 420. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 1 
Acknowledgment 6 
Corporations 5 
Criminal convictions, criminal proceedings 16 
Criminal proceedings 12-17 
Criminal proceedings - Criminal convictions 16 
Criminal proceedings - Death penalty 12 
Criminal proceedings - Guilty and mentally ill persons 17 
Criminal proceedings - Guilty pleas 13 
Criminal proceedings - Limitation of prosecutions 15 
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Case No. 090914481 ' 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 11th day of February, 
2010, commencing at the hour of 10:02 a.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE KATE TOOMEY, 
sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of 
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For the State: CHAD D.. NOAKES 
Attorney at Law 
Skordas, Caston & Hyde 
341 South-Main Street, #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant: JUDITH D. WOLFERTS-
. CAMILLE N. JOHNSON 
Attorneys at Law 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange -Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah ' 84145 
* * * 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: • Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
THE COURT: This is the matter of Pearson vs. City 
of South Jordan, it's Case No. 090914481. 
Please state your appearances. 
MR. NOAKES: Chad Noakes on behalf of the plaintiff, 
with my client, Dan Pearson-. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. JOHNSON: Camille Johnson and Judy Wolferts on 
behalf of the City of South Jordan. 
THE COURT: All right. Welcome, everybody. 
I was preparing for this oral argument this morning 
by reviewing the things that have been submitted and noted 
that a memorandum in opposition to the counter-motion for 
partial summary judgment is not in the file. And the docket 
doesn't reflect that we have ever received it. And I noted., 
from your notice to submit and from your responsive..-.." 
..memorandum, that one has been .prepared and served on you but 
it's not in the file. • 
So, I—I want to.call that to your attention, Mr.. 
3 
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1 Noakes, because I—I Tm going to need you to file it. 
2 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, may I address that? 
3 THE COURT: Sure. 
4 MS. JOHNSON: What we did receive in response to our 
5 Cross-Motion' for Summary Judgment was PlaintiffTs Memorandum 
6 in Opposition to City of South JordanTs Cross-Motion for 
7 Partial"Summary Judgment. We did not ever receive a reply 
8 memorandum— 
9 THE COURT: Okay. And—and—okay. And maybe—but— 
10 but the memorandum in opposition isn!t in here. 
11 MS. JOHNSON: Okay. 
12 THE COURT: So, Mr. Noakes, I assure that you can 
13 file it and then IT11 read it. 
14 MR. NOAKES: So, it!s just—it's just incorrect 
15 then—you do not have a copy of our'memorandum in opposition 
16 to- City of South Jordan's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
17 Judgment? 
18 THE COURT: Correct. Correct. Let me—let me tell 
19 you what I have. r have the Memorandum of Points and 
20 Authorities in Support of Mr. Pearson's Motion for Partial 
21 Summary Judgment, T have the CityTs combined Memorandum in 
. 22 ' -Support of ".the 'City"' s Motion for. Partial Summary Judgment and 
23 in'opposition to Mr. Pearson's Motion, Then the next docket 
24 entry and that was filed on November 12th. The.next docket 
' 25 entry is December 21 and 'it's the City's Reply in Support of 
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its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. There's nothing 
else. 
So, if a reply memorandum was prepared, itTs never 
been filed and if a memorandum in opposition-to the City's 
motion, has been prepared,•it's never been filed. 
MR. NOAKES: And—and I— 
THE COURT: So, I think ITm missing at least one and 
possibly two memoranda from your side. 
MR. NOAKES: Well, there—there would only be one 
memoranda issue, which is our Memorandum in—in opposition— 
THE COURT: In opposition to the City's motion? 
MR. NOAKES:* --at which point that* we—we covered 
all- the bases that we felt like we needed. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, we're not looking for a reply 
m.emo, but we are looking for the memorandum in. opposition? 
MR. NOAKES: "Yes. And I—and I do have, and I guess 
we'll have to reconstruct what happened with the Court. I— 
well, I would say that I'm certain that at our office, we have 
a filed version, a stamped, filed version of that. 
THE COURT: I'm not doubting you on that and—and I 
note from the CityTs notice to submit in which, you know, they 
identified everything that they think has .been filed, that on 
December 9th, Mr. Pearson filed his memorandum in opposition 
to the City's motion for a partial summary judgment. So, I 
know you've seen it. 
5 
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MS. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: I just want to make clear, I haven1t 
seen it and I need to. see it. So— 
MS. JOHNSON: And should I—-I think I know what 
happened, looking at it more carefully now. It says Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, West Jordan, State 
of Utah, on the opposition memorandum. ' My guess is it got 
filed in West Jordan. 
THE COURT: Maybe. But at any rate and—and I just 
want to assure Mr. Pearson that I*will take into account 
everything that I need to take into account. But what I would 
propose today is-that you'argue it, I'll take it under 
advisement and then you make -sure I get a copy of it. 
"MR. NOAKES: And—and-I'm confident that although 
our—our memorandum in opposition is important, thereTs a— 
certainly a—a theme of issues that are worked .through in our 
motion for summary judgment. 
THE COURT: I would—I would think so. 
MR. NOAKES: I feel--
THE COURT: Now, alternatively, if you feel that— 
that I just really need to read it before I hear the argument, 
we can postpone this hearing. I—I mean, I'm fine with that, 
too. But I just want to make sure that ultimately— 
MR. NOAKES: -I'm—ITm certainly—, 
THE COURT: — I get everything I need together. 
6 
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MR. NOAKES: Absolutely. And ITm certainly 
comfortable moving forward with oral argument— 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. NOAKES: —and I'll be sure that you have a— a 
copy of that within— 
• THE COURT: All right. Yeah. And I—and I!m sorry, 
I tend not .to prepare for hearings like this until right 
before them, because, unfortunately, because of the volume of 
stuff that I have, if I had read this last week, I wouldn't 
remember it. So,—so, I, you know, anyway, so, I did not 
discover this until this morning. 
Okay. -So, .are you ready to-proceed? 
MR. NOAKES: I_ am, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. NOAKES: Your Honor, as the City points out, I 
believe, in its reply memorandum, this case has arrived here 
through a long and kind of -curious journey. 
THE- COURT: Yeah. And it apparently has been all '" 
over the valley, so— 
•MR. NOAKES: And certainly, weTre optimistic that 
today, here, with this Court, we'll be able to arrive at the 
destination that my client has been hoping for for some time . 
and that is to have judicial review of the. statute at issue, 
Utah Code Annotated 10-3-1105. 
THE COURT: Right. 
7 
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1 MR. NOAKES: . So, that that statute can be . 
2 interpreted and applied to the facts which fortunately in this 
3 "case, at least the relevant facts don't appear to be disputed. 
4 As I see it, there are three different 
5 interpretations that the Court might reach of the particular 
6 statute as it applies to my client's case. The first would be 
•7 that the statute provides affirmative rights and protections 
8 to a group-of-employees•and then -excludes from thpse 
9 protections a enumerated list of particular position. 
10 The Court may find, as we certainly argue, that my 
11 client is not among those positions excluded and therefore, he 
12 . enjoys the protections that are offered by 10-3-1105 and in 
13 that event, the result would be, is that my client's 
14- termination, which is not disputed, was based on the finding 
15 that he was mandatorily an' at will employee under that 
16 statute, that that finding would have been inaccurate. 
17 The second finding that would be potential is for 
IB the Court to find that in fact my client's position was among 
19 those excluded positions; however, adopting our interpretation 
20 that 10-3-1105 is an affirmative statute, meaning that it 
21 simply bestows-on certain individuals additional rights, but 
22 that it doesn't take away anybody's rights or mandate the at 
23' will status of any employee. 
24 • Under that interpretation, my client's position then 
25 would simply be unaffected by the statute and again, we would 
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1 argue that because the CityTs basis for the termination was 
2 its interpretation that the statute mandates the at will 
3 status, that again that—the basis for that termination would 
4 be contrary to the law. 
5 Of course, the final interpretation would be what 
6 the City is advocating for, which is that the statute mandates 
7 his at will status. Under that finding, the reason that our 
8 motion and the cross-motions are both partial summary 
9 judgments is because there are some additional issues; namely, 
10 that if, even though—even if the Court were to find that he 
11 were mandatorily an at will employee, there1s an issue of—of 
12 whether or not the City acted incorrectly when it extended 
13 what we argue to be an employment contract. 
14 THE COURT: Sure. And I—I noticed that you have a 
15 (inaudible) estoppel claim and—and you know, and .things like 
16 that, s o — 
17 MR. NOAKES: Yeah. Our—our argument is—is very 
18 - simple and straightforward. When we read the statute, my 
19 client1s position is not among those listed as being excluded. 
20 What the City argues for is for-the Court to broaden its 
21 interpretation, find that the statute-is ambiguous and then 
22 adopt a new standard that it is proposing, which I would call 
• 23 the second-in-command standard, that is that the evaluation 
24 should be whether or not my clientTs position, or any 
25 position, for that matter, is second in order behind a police 
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1 chief. And it argues that, if not, it will result in a—an 
2 absurd result, which is that somebody that is second in 
•3 command is still protected" by the statute. 
4 • I argue that it!s exactly the opposite. Currently, 
5 in Utah, police departments have a wide variety of different 
6 structures that they can put together with lieutenants and 
7 sergeants and captains and those are and should be based on 
8' the relevant statute. And there are a number of individuals, 
9 ' a number of sergeants, a number of lieutenants, another of—of 
•10 deputy police chiefs and assistant police chiefs, who, if you 
11 went back and—and simply applied a second-in-command statute 
12 or"interpretation, may suddenly be at will, even though it's 
13 not the understanding of, or intent of any of those 
14 individuals to make that person at will, simply because they 
15 happen to be the person of greatest authority aside from the • 
16 police chief. That would create a—a new legal precedent and 
17 a new standard and the statute is simply not that—that 
18 ambiguous and certainly doesnTt imply that that type of new 
19 standard should'it be taken. "Were it the legislature's intent 
'20 • to have taken a second-in-command standard and made it so 
21 • broad, I believe it clearly would have done so and I don't 
22 believe that there is ambiguity in this statute simply because 
23 there are—the City can find other positions that potentially 
24 could or could -not have been included. 
25 The statute, the way that it's set up is to identify 
10 
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1 particular positions and exclude those and I find it very 
2 telling with respect to the assistant fire chief. 
3 THE COURT: Well, it says deputy or assistant. 
4 MR. NOAKES: Uh huh (affirmative). And—and I find 
5 it interesting that it says that the "or assistant" so that it 
6 intentionally includes both of those, but doesn't share the 
7 same language with a police chief, it simply says deputy, the 
8 word "deputy""simply an all-encompassing term that either 
9 would have not included assistant with respect to fire chiefs 
10 or they would have used the same language in addressing police' 
11 chiefs. It would say deputy or assistant police chiefs so 
12 that it's consistent. 
13 The way that I—and again, the—the approach I— 
14 THE COURT: Well, the omission has to be meaningful, 
15 doesn't it? 
16 MR. NOAKES: The omission has to.be—certainly, if— 
17 if the omission, if they include assistant with fire chiefs 
18 but don't include it with police chiefs, I believe that that 
19 has to be given some reasonable explanation. And the 
20 explanation would simply be that the intent of the -statute is 
21 to name particular positions, based on title, and if a city 
22 chooses to give that person that particular title so that it's 
'23 covered by the statute, then so be it. If a city chooses, not 
24 to, then that is the- prerogative of the city. 
25 And I believe that the approach that the city would 
11 
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1 have is that the statute is—somehow should conform to the 
2 norms of what cities do, where my argument is, is that the 
'•'3 statute is there and the—the cities have the responsibility 
4 to conform their structure to the statute. And that allows 
5 people, such as my client, in assessing a job offer that's 
6 made as a merit employee, one that sits down and talks about 
7 the terms of his employment and is recruited on the basis of 
8 coming over to a merit employee position, my client should 
9 have the ability to turn to the statute and to determine 
10 whether or not that is consistent with the law or determine 
11 whether or not he's going to be mandatorily an at will 
12 employee, because certainly at will status is a significant, 
13 if not one of the most significant considerations that 
14 somebody might take in determining, am I taking an employment 
15 position where I can simply be dismissed at any time? Or is 
16. this something that I can count on for myself and my family? 
17 If I could make a few notes about the City's reply. 
18 I—I do—we don't disagree that the City makes the argument 
19 that we do not dispute that my client is—was the second in 
20 command. We don't dispute the statements that my client made 
21 at the hearing which infer that he was the position beneath a 
22 ' police chief. What • I want to make sure that the distinction 
23 that's made is, is that we don't believe that saying second in 
24 command had any particular legal significance because second 
25 in command is not a—a term upon which the statute is built or 
12 
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1 the relevant case law is built. 
2 So, in—in admitting that he stated that he was • 
3 second in command, we're not admitting that we agree that he 
4 falls under a particular legal classification or that there is 
5 a—a framework that should be provided. 
6 And again, ITm aware that there is a number of—of 
7 police departments and—and employees of police departments 
8 who are—have followed this case and are very curious to see 
9 how this case will pan out -and the reason is, as I think that 
10 they correctly observe, that—that agreeing with the City 
11 would create a—a new standard that could be detrimental to 
12 other employees. And I think as soon as we see that, it's a— 
13- certainly a red flag in terms of whether or not it's—we're 
14 simply interpreting a statute with the plain language or 
15 whether -or not we're going beyond in trying to guess at 
16 • perhaps what the—what the legislature would have wanted. 
17 If the Court has any questions? If not, I'll submit 
18 it. 
19 THE COURT: No. Thank you. 
2 0 MR. NOAKES:- Thank you. 
21 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, the resolution of these 
22 cross-motions for summary judgment is really a matter of 
23 statutory construction of Section 10-3-1105 and a 
24 determination whether South Jordan's assistant police chief 
25 position was at will under that statute. 
13 
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1 And let me talk to you just a little bit about 
2 Section 10-3-1105 and its significance. It identifies certain 
3 municipal employees as at will, including a police chief, a 
4 deputy police chief and a deputy of a head of a municipal 
5 department. And the significance to those people who are 
6 identified is that they are not therefore merit employees -and 
7 not entitled to the process that it laid out in Section 
8 10-3-1106, when they're terminated. 
9 Those at will employees identified under section 
10 10-3-1105 can be terminated incident to or through changes in 
11 city government. And this makes sense because as a new 
12 administration takes hole, a new mayor, a new city council, a 
13 new city administrator comes into play, it's important that 
14 city government have the flexibility to make sure that these 
15 appointed people have—share the same vision for the city. 
16 Now, Mr. Pearson contends that we should look simply 
17 at the plain language of Section 10-3-1105, Subsection (d) r 
18 that—that paragraph that refers to a deputy police chief and-
19 -and because he did not have the title of deputy police chief, 
20 he believes "that that plain language solves it all, but 
21 because Section 10-3-1105 and particularly Subsection 2(d) can 
22 be reasonably understood to have more than one plausible 
23 meaning, the courts determined—have determined that under 
24 those circumstances, the statute and the statutory language is 
2 5 ' ambiguous. 
14 
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THE COURT: Well, then, why doesnTt it say deputy or 
assistant the way-that it does with regard to the fire 
department? 
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I believe the legislature 
provided a catch-all when it identified a deputy of a head of 
a municipal department. And the reason that the statute is 
susceptible to two interpretations is because you can either 
have someone with the precise title of deputy police chief or 
it can refer to a category of employees who hold a position 
thatTs really second in command. 
Itrs important in order to assess, really, the 
meaning of the statute to look not just at that particular 
line, but the statute as a whole and the courts have said we 
can interpret the provisions in harmony with other related 
statutes in other—in the same or related chapters. And so 
thatTs the approach the City's taken is that we need to look 
at the whole -statute and of course, look at other related 
statutory chapters. 
But let me focus just on that line for a minute. 
Consider what a deputy is. Black1s Law Dictionary defines it 
as a substitute, a person duly authorized by an officer to 
exercise some or all of the functions pertaining to the office 
in the place and stead of the latter. 
And that's exactly the position that Mr. Pearson 
•held, admittedly. He doesnTt deny that he didnTt hold—that 
15 
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1 he—that he held the—the deputy position, it's just that he 
2 says, my title was assistant, not deputy. 
3 Black's Law Dictionary defines assistant as a 
4 deputy. The two terms are really synonymous and that!s the 
5 ' plain language of the statute. 
6 THE COURT: But isn't it at least possible that a 
7 municipality would adopt job titles purposefully to either 
B fall within the reach of the statute or not? 
9 MS. JOHNSON: I think itTs foreseeable, certainly; 
10 but I also think that it's foreseeable and anticipated that 
11 cities are going to rely upon the general categories, theyTre 
12 going to rely upon the category of deputy in identifying their 
13 people and we know that most cities do not have a deputy 
14* police chief. They have an assistant police chief. So, I 
15 think they' re relying upon the catch-all or the concept that a 
16 deputy refers to someone who substitutes for the chief. 
17* And I think it's curious, when you look at the 
18 • language, the statute doesn't say "the deputy police chief," 
19 it says ,Ta deputy of police chief." It's —and it's the—it's 
20 the indefinite article that's used "a" rather than "the", a 
21 definite article, so— 
22 THE COURT: Suggesting there could be more than one? 
23 MS. JOHNSON: But what—exactly. Suggesting that 
24 it's a category, "a" deputy, not "the" deputy, but "a"' deputy. 
25 Now, if you look' at—again, look at the text of the 
16 
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statute as a whole, not just the plain language of that line, 
you see that the legislature has identified a whole category 
of people who are at will and those are deputies of heads of a 
municipal department, .again, using the indefinite article, "a" 
deputy of the head of a municipal department. Again 
indicating, when you look at the statute as a whole, it—the 
legislature intended for a category-type, or position-type 
approach. 
And then let me focus in on the language of some of 
the other provisions that I think are—are helpful to the 
Court. Under the—under Utah's Civil Service Commission 
statute and this is the statute that deals with cities of the 
first and second class. 
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). 
MS. JOHNSON: Both deputies and assistant police 
chiefs are considered at will. And so, those terms are used 
interchangeably in the Civil Service Commission statute. 
This is the observed results that we talked about in 
our briefing. If you could have, for example, a deputy and an 
assistant police chief in a city of the first class, both 
being identified as at will, whereas in a city like South 
Jordan, where we've—I—we've used the title "assistant police 
chief," we don't have an at will employee, whereas if they 
were a deputy, they would be. So, it's an inconsistent 
result, especially in keeping with the Civil Service 
17 
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1 Commission rules. 
2 There's another statute that deals with the cities 
3 of the-third, fourth and fifth class and in this particular 
4 statute, it!s 10-3-918, it talks about a—a chief of police 
5 • and a marshall being treated the same, even though the titles 
6 are different. They are—they are treated as one. 
7 And so, under the proposal that Mr. Pearson 
8 suggests, someone who is identified as a police marshall in a 
9 city of the third, fourth or fifth class, would—would be 
10 entitled to the protections of 10-3-1106 and not be at will, 
11 whereas the person who is identified as the police chief would 
12 be appointed and not entitled to those protections. So, 
13 again, an inconsistent result. And-the legislature has used 
14 these terms to substitute one for the other. 
15 There!s a case that's worth looking at, itT s Ward 
16 vs. Richfield, and itfs a 1989 case, so, itTs the predecessor 
17 statute to the one we1re looking at. That predecessor statute 
18 said that any member of. a police department was exempt and at 
19 will under 10-3-1105. And the city employee in that case was 
20 referred to, his title was city marshall. 
21 And the Court.of Appeals found and then the Supreme 
22 Court affirmed that Section 10-3-1105 made him an at will 
23 employee. He was arguing, I'm not a member of the .police • 
24 department, because the statutory language referred to member 
25 of a police department, he said, I'm a city marshall, I'm the 
18 
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1 .city marshall. 
2 And the—and the court said no, they said because 
3 other sections in title can refer interchangeably between a 
4 chief of police and a city marshall, the—the 10-3-1105 at 
5 will provisions applied to Mr. Ward in the case, in that 
6 Richfield City case. One worth looking at because it helps us 
7 understand the court's approach to the broad reading of those-
8 -of those titles. 
9 I mentioned the Civil Service Commission provision. 
10 There's also Utah's Criminal Code refers interchangeably 
11 between an assistant police chief and—and someone who's the 
12 second in command in the police department and all of that's 
13 found in our brief. 
14 I think it's'significant that the Utah Code doesn't 
15 dictate how municipalities title their police department and 
16 hierarchy. It—it—the courts really— 
17 THE COURT: It's interesting. 
IB MS. JOHNSON: Yeah. It kind of anticipates that 
19 we're going to use the term, "chief," "marshall,"— 
20 THE COURT: Right. 
21 MS. JOHNSON: —"commissioner," "director," 
22 "deputy," "assistant," and I think' that's why that catch-all 
23 provision, Subparagraph (h), that a deputy of a head of a 
24 municipal department makes all of those people at will. 
25 The courts have said that when you've got an 
19 
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ambiguity in.a statute like this one, you can look beyond the 
statutory language and beyond the statute as a whole and 
beyond the text of other statutes in the-same chapter and look 
at.policy consideration and also_ the undisputed facts to help 
resolve the ambiguity. 
So, let me' focus for just a minute on the policy 
considerations and I mentioned this right at the beginning. 
10-3-1105 was entitl—it was intended to except from the 
protections of 1106 those employees who are policy makers and 
policy implementers. And the—and the police chief and his 
second in command are directly involved in a meaningful way in 
the administration of the police department. 'Just because the 
City chooses the term "assistant" as opposed to "deputy," 
doesnTt have any bearing on the policy reasons behind allowing 
for at will termination of these people, particularly as city 
government changes. 
And I think one of the other important parts to 
these policy considerations is that the City should not have 
to always be conforming their job descriptions and job titles 
to the statute because the legislature provided that catch-all 
provision. 
Turning to the un— 
' THE COURT: But again, I think it could be 
purposeful. 
MS. JOHNSON: I think it could be purposeful, your 
20 
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Honor, but I think, given the context, looking at the plain 
language of the statute, the statute as a whole and Chapter 10 
and where you see that the legislature has clearly used these 
terms interchangeably with respect to police departments, that, 
'catch-all provision was purposeful, it was to give the cities 
an opportunity to collectively pull all these second in 
commands in, all of these "A" deputy types so that they1re 
all—they're all at will employees. 
I just want to mention and Mr. Noakes did briefly, 
the undisputed facts in this case, because while they believe 
that they1re not relevant to the determinations, courts have 
said that undisputed facts may be considered when youTre 
helping to resolve the ambiguity in a statute. 
And here, we know that Mr. Pearson acknowledges that 
he was second in command, we know that the letterhead showed 
him as the chief of police operations for a time. He admitted 
that his responsibilities required him to take over as police 
chief when the chief wasnTt available. 
We also know that when he was hired back in 2002, it 
was the earlier statute we were looking at and all members of 
the police department were at will employees under Section 
10-3-1105. 
So, your Honor, reading the plain language of 
Section 10-3-1105 and the text of the statute as a whole and 
interpreting its provisions in harmony with the other chapters 
21 
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1 that we've discussed, I think the ambiguity is resolved in 
2 favor of interpreting the phrase "deputy" to mean a category 
3 of -employees who hold that second in command spot. 
4 Policy considerations and the undisputed facts in 
5 . this .case'also support, that determination and we ask the Court 
6 to find that, given the statutory construction. 10-3-1105, Mr. 
7 Pearson was an at will employee as the assistant police chief 
8 in the City of South Jordan. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MS. JOHNSON: Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Noakes? 
12 MR. NOAKES: Thank you, your Honor. 
13 First, I'd like to address my interpretation of what 
'14 the city refers to as a catch-all provision. My argument is 
15 that the purpose of that provision is because it is difficult 
16 to predict what new agencies or departments a municipality may 
17 choose to—to construct. Municipalities are always free to 
18 create a new department, a public service, a public safety, 
19 something that would not make it, for example, a police 
20 department. 
21 I believe that the—that quote, unquote, catch-all 
22 provision is—simply meant that if there is a new department 
23 that's created, that you can then simply have a—the head of 
24 that department or if- you have a deputy head of that 
25 department to be covered by the statute. And that approach is 
22 
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1 consistent with the enumeration of so many specific positions 
2 within the statute. 
3 Were the catch-all provision simply to be read that 
4 any deputy would be considered an at will employee, then there 
5 would have been no need to have the specific enumerations that 
6 are listed, there simply could have-been that one provision, 
7 they could have—or they could have simply said, you know, a 
8 head or a, you know, deputy of a municipal department is at 
9 will and—and not go any further than-that, because they've 
10 already covered all the positions. 
11 Rather, the way the city wants to read it, they went 
12 • through and listed very specific positions of superintendent, 
13 et cetera, et cetera and then at the end, include this giant 
14 catch-all provision. Again, I think that a reasonable and 
15 consistent interpretation is that they're referring to the 
16 variance there can be in departments with a new municipality 
17 and not that particular position. 
18 . An interesting result of' a looking beyond a title 
19 and asking questions, for example, is well, if that person— 
20 that person's second in command if they make a policy 
21 decision. Suddenly, we have a circumstance where somebody 
22 would, easily be hired as a non at will employee and end up as 
23 an at will employee because they work into a more policy 
24 driven role and then potentially a modification fall out of 
25 that. I—I just—there!s—there's even more ambiguity than— 
23 
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1 than anything found in the statute when we create a standard 
2 that isn't discussed and would be very difficult to define, 
3 what is exactly a second in command. 
4 Of note, there is—there has been no evidence 
5 presented that my client was a policy maker, that he had ever 
6 made any policy decisions within the decision. Suddenly, when 
7 we're applying the second in command, well, does that make— 
8 does'that mean that he falls outside, would-that change it if 
9 he had? Again, we get into an analysis that's much—so fact-
io- detailed that—that itTs just inconsistent with a basic plain 
11 language, title specific provision. 
12 And to my knowledge and my understanding, police 
13 departments and fire departments, they are absolutely title 
14 driven agencies. There is working up from a lieutenant to a 
15 sergeant to a captain. The title specific approach is not 
16 something that is foreign-at all to cities or that we would 
17 think that the legislature would say, oh, we're—we're going 
18 to confuse them by making this title specific. 
19 Also, if we—my—my argument is that certainly, that 
20 we should be looking at what the statute was at the time my 
21 client was terminated. I think the statute- as it was at the 
22 time that my client was hired is more relevant to the contract 
23 question; however, if we—if we do look at what was the—the. 
24 statusr I think we also then have to take into consideration, 
25 that gets us into the—to the document that my client received 
24 • 
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1 at the time when he was hired, which specifically states that 
2 department heads and probationary employees are at will. If 
3 you're not a department head and once youTre out of the 
4 probationary stage, you1re no longer a probationary employee. 
5 Again, I think that the more relevant argument deals with what 
6 the statute is, but if we want to look back and start asking, 
7 okay, what exactly was it when he was hired, either -the city 
8 didnTt know, didnTt understand the statute or their policy was 
9 simply in violation of the law and it's very difficult for 
10 them to go back and try to reconstruct that. 
11 So, again, my—my argument is, is that there is no— 
12 ' well, the—and again, the—the statute in this case needs to 
13 be applied to the specific circumstances. At the end of the 
14 day, although this may present some precedent for future 
15 cases, that it is a fact specific case where the Court has the 
'16 ability to say under the circumstances of the hiring and 
17 everything that we know, about Mr. Pearson and the way that 
18 South Jordan did things, is it fair for the City to rely on 
19 this statute and to call him in and terminate him without 
20 saying anything other than, we're letting you go because 
21 you're an at will employee and there was no discussion as to 
22 whether or not you are an at will employee, look at the 
23 statute, the statute says you're an at will employee. 
24 So, under the circumstances, I think we can look 
25 specifically at the way South Jordan was—the way that he was 
25 
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1 hired, which was specifically as a merit employee as I 
2 interpret the employment contract and that their structure was 
3 a title specific structure, he was—he was brought in as an 
4 assistant employee, where his employment status was discussed 
5 and then, -reviewing the relevant statutes and my client 
6 understanding the basics of the statutes, was put in a 
7 position essentially where he had to, potentially, the City's 
8 arguing that they offered him an- illegal contract. I think 
9 the—the better resolution is to simply say that there was a 
10 mistake made in interpreting the statute, it's going to be 
11 different, potentially, for different individuals who may.be 
12 in different capacities within other organizations, but as it 
13 applies to my client, who was an assistant police chief within 
14 South Jordan, he was hired as a merit employee, he as not 
15 excluded from the—from the protections and he should be found 
16 to be a merit employee, or simply not—certainly not a member 
17 of an at will employee. 
18 And again, I know the City—City has a different 
19 interpretation, but I've read the statute, many, many, many 
20 times and I simply do not read that as—the current statute as 
21 • intending to take away the rights that a city might want to 
22 have to hire an assistant police chief as a merit employee; in 
23 fact, and—and the legislature doesn't indicate that— 
24 THE COURT: Right. And that's why I suggested I 
'25 think it could be purposeful. 
26 
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1 MR. NOAKES: So, again, I—I agree. I believe it 
2 was purposeful and I believe that my client would be entitled 
3 to summary judgment on that matter. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
5 MR. NOAKES: Thank you, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, would you like to add 
7 anything? 
8 MS. JOHNSON: Just—just briefly, your Honor. 
9 Just a note that to the extent Mr. Noakes argues 
10 about any contract that was made, that is outside the summary-
11 -the cross-motions for summary judgment. 
12 Let me address his argument that Subsection (h) is 
13 not a catch-all. Mr. Noakes argues that it!s just simply for 
14 .new departments that may be created, that aren't otherwise 
15 identified in Section 10-3-1105. 
16 Let me go back to the analysis under 10-3-918 about 
17 a city marshall being the same as a city police chief in 
18 cities of the—of the third, fourth and fifth class. If 
19 that's the case, we know then that a city marshall is the head 
20 of a municipal department-and so naturally, his deputy, his 
21 second in command would be exempt under—under Subsection (h). 
22 The notion is that that catch-all isn't intended 
23 just for newly-created city departments, but applies to the 
24 situations like we see in Section 10-3-91B where you've got 
25 the term city—or police chief and marshall being used 
27 
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1 interchangeably. So, the deputy—deputy of either one of 
2 those would then be at will. 
3 And I just want to call the Court's attention to one 
4 last thing and that is, at the time that Mr. Pearson was 
5 terminated, the letterhead stationery did identify Lindsay 
6 Shepherd as the Director of Public Safety and it identified 
7 Mr. Pearson as the chief of police. He was essentially acting 
8 as the second in command, but he as identified as the chief of 
9 police. Again, this is an example of Section (h) providing a' 
10 catch-all for circumstances where a city, for whatever 
11 purpose, needs to reorganize a particular department. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 
13 MS. JOHNSON: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Noakes, can you get me that brief by 
15 Friday? 
16 MR. NOAKES: Oh, absolutely, your Honor. . 
17 THE COURT: All right.. Thank you. 
18 ITm going to take this under advisement and I'll get 
19 you a decision as soon as I can. 
2 0 MR. NOAKES: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 (Whereupon, this, hearing was concluded.) 
22 
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FI1EB BISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR - 6 2010 
3AWT LAKByCGtiNTY / 
By—yj r ? % v 
*• « Deputy Cferk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 090914481 
DATE: APRIL 6, 2010 
The matters of the parties' cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment came 
before the Court for argument on February 11, 2010, at the conclusion of which the 
Court took both motions under advisement. The parties agree that for purposes of 
these motions, there are no facts in dispute, and each seeks a declaration of Daniel 
Pearson's employment status when he was Assistant Police Chief employed by the City 
of South Jordan. Having considered the parties' written submissions and the 
arguments of counsel, the motions are ready for decision. 
The undisputed material facts are as follows: Mr. Pearson held the position 
Assistant Police Chief of the City of South Jordan ("South Jordan"). On January 30, 
2007, City Manager Rick Horst terminated Mr. Pearson's employment, citing his at-will 
1 
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status pursuant to Utah statute. The Chief of Police and the Assistant City Manager 
affirmed this decision, as did the City Employee Appeals Board. 
This case turns upon the construction of Utah Code section 10-3-1105, which 
provides: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall 
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge . . . only as 
provided in Section 10-3-1106.1 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising 
executive power in the municipality; 
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department 
who is a member of the classified civil service in a first or second class city; 
( c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
.(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
(i) a superintendent; 
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality; or 
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or 
(I) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
If Mr. Pearson's job is one of those identified in subsection (2), he is an at-will employee 
with none of the protections afforded by another portion of the Code. 
Mr. Pearson argues that the statute unambiguously identifies specific positions 
which are excluded from the procedural protections afforded merit employees. 
Because his position was "Assistant Police Chief," a title not on the list, he was not an 
at-will employee and therefore could not be terminated except pursuant to Section 10-
3-1106. 
Section 10-3-1106 provides various safeguards and procedural mechanisms for 
appealing adverse action. 
2 
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South Jordan contends the statute is ambiguous because the word "deputy 
police chief is subject to more than one interpretation. Because of that ostensible 
ambiguity, it urges the Court to look to the facts, and determine that the position 
Assistant Police Chief "equates to and is the same as a "deputy police chief." 
Additionally, it argues that "a deputy of a head of a municipal department" would also 
encompass Mr. Pearson's job. 
In determining the meaning of a statute, a court looks to its words, giving them 
their plain and ordinary meaning. The words are assumed to have their common and 
customary meaning and are considered within the context of the statute, interpreting 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same and related chapters. A statute is 
ambiguous if its language has more than one meaning. Only when the language of the 
statute is ambiguous may the Court look further to determine legislative intent. 
The word "deputy" is defined as "a person appointed as a substitute with power 
to act," and "a second in command or assistant who usually takes charge when his or 
her superior is absent." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11 th ed.). The word 
"assistant" is a person who assists, a helper. Black's Law Dictionary defines "deputy" 
as "[a] substitute; a person duly authorized by an officer to exercise some or all of the 
functions pertaining to the office, in the place and stead of the latter." As these terms 
are commonly understood, an assistant is "one who assists," whereas a deputy is "A 
person named or empowered to act for another." The word "deputy" thus encompasses 
someone not only who assists someone else, but someone who, with greater authority, 
may conduct the business of another. From an organizational standpoint, other 
3 
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portions of the Code suggest that the distinction has hierarchical implications.2 
Accordingly, while there are some similarities in the meanings of these terms, they are 
not interchangeable, but are separate and distinct, and the Court does not in the 
context of this statute find that the word "deputy" is ambiguous. 
That the Legislature intended to distinguish the two is evident in subsection (f), 
which identifies as an at-will position that of "a deputy or assistant fire chief." If the 
words "deputy" and "assistant" were synonymous, then the use of the word "assistant" 
in this subsection of the statute is redundant and superfluous. The Court assumes that 
the statute's use of the word "assistant" in this context is advised and meaningful, and 
that its omission in subsection (d) is correspondingly meaningful. Interpreting the 
statute in the manner urged by South Jordan would be to insert language into 
subsection (d) that isn't there. 
Elsewhere South Jordan suggests that the Court consider Mr. Pearson's role as 
second-in-command as the equivalent of "deputy police chief," but here again, if this 
was the Legislature's intent, it could have added language to that phrase, such as 
"deputy police chief or its functional equivalent" The fact that it did not is meaningful. 
Moreover, because the language of the statute is not ambiguous, the Court cannot 
engage in the factual analysis and policy analysis urged by South Jordan. 
South Jordan also urges the Court to construe subsection (h)-which applies to "a 
deputy of a head of a municipal department"- as a catch-all provision which includes 
Mr. Pearson's title and position. But this is to read a redundancy into the statute, and to 
2See e.g. Utah Code § 10-3-1002(3). 
4 
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render meaningless the distinctions among most of the other subsections. In any 
event, the Court finds no ambiguity in the use of the word deputy in this context. 
Because Mr. Pearson's position is not one of those identified in subsection (2), 
his employment may be terminated only as provided in section 10-3-1106. That section 
establishes some protections for employees-for example, by prohibiting their discharge 
based upon politics or religion-and establishes a procedure for seeking administrative 
review of adverse actions. In other words, the position is not simply at-will. 
Counsel for Mr. Pearson is directed to draft a proposed form of partial summary 
judgment and to submit it to the Court at an appropriate time consistent with the 
provisions of Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this ^ d a v
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